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Part i: Overview 
Prelude 
It is obviously premature to characterize today's growing dissent 
with any finality, but it is reasonable to suggest that it is moral in 
character, just as all great revolutions are. Technology has created 
for some of us an enormous affluence, and affluence tends t o  create a 
vast disturbance of the moral order. It is not only the immorality of 
the privileged wealthy vs. the underprivileged starving; it is a kind of 
vicious hypocrisy that manifests itself so clearly to the young, In 
order to guard the possessions of the affluent, it is necessary to use 
police force., 
righteously to suppress those who do not respect their fellow men. But 
the use of police force is also attacked on moral grounds, because it 
The use of such force is defended on moral grounds-- 
is the use of force to suppress those who have a moral right to the kind 
of life they rightfully deserve. 
I was struck--both physically and mentally--by the force of this 
dilemma of emerging morality, when I was riding in the club car of a 
train which was passing a playground in a black ghetto of New York 
City. 
next to me. After we in the club car had recovered from the shock and 
A young black hurled a rock which partially smashed the window 
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refreshed our d r inks ,  an o lde r  woman ac ross  from m e  kept r epea t ing ,  
"They ought t o  be  punished! They ought t o  be punished?'' None of u s  
disagreed,  although w e  might have, had someone asked: who is  "they"? 
Now t h a t  moral i ty  is  speaking t o  us  i n  such f o r c e f u l  terms, few can 
doubt t h a t  "they" should be punished. 
Another view of an emerging moral i ty  i s  a very common r e a c t i o n  t o  
emerging technology. I n  a course I gave t o  Chemical Engineering s tuden t s  
on sc i ence  and s o c i e t y ,  t h e  s tuden t s  were asked t o  respond t o  a l i s t  
of "breakthroughs" reported i n  R. Taylor 's  The Biological  Time Bomb. -
The l ist  included such items as bfain-to-computer, brain-to-brain 
l inkages,  c loning humans ( r e p l i c a t i n g  humans from t h e  same ce l l ) ,  and 
so on. One s tuden t  wrote: "The news of a human h e a r t  t r ansp lan t  and 
t h e  amazing success  of Apollo 8 had given m e  a g r e a t  pleasure and 
s a t i s f a c t i o n .  . e e I talked to  some of my f r i e n d s  and a l l  of them 
had t h e  same gay f ee l ing .  
throughs. When I f i r s t  read Taylor 's  p red ic t ions  I w a s  shocked. The 
u p s e t t i n g  po in t  w a s  t h a t  when I w a s  looking through the  list each one 
of t h e  g lo r ious  d i scove r i e s  by i t s e l f  w a s  as g r e a t  and deceiving as 
t h e  Apollo p r o j e c t ,  b u t  t ak ing  t h e  l ist  as a whole and t r y i n g  t o  p r o j e c t  
a p i c t u r e  of s o c i e t y  i n  the  year  2000, s ay ,  w a s  i n t o l e r a b l e .  . . . I 
d id  t h e  same tes t  on my f r i e n d s  and not  a s i n g l e  person had a s m i l e  
on h i s  f a c e  when he  w a s  through reading 'the list." 
None objected t o  t h e s e  g lo r ious  break- 
But are these  examples concerned with mora l i t y  a t  all--or r a t h e r  
j u s t  another  c i v i l  w a r  between those who have and those who have n o t ,  
o r  t hose  who decide and those who do not? I f  moral i ty  is  "emerging," 
where has  i t  been? Does it speak t o  us  only a t  times? Then why is i t  
s i l e n t  a t  o the r  times? And how does i t  happen t h a t  i t  speaks i n  
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d i f f e r e n t ,  con t r ad ic to ry  ways t o  d i f f e r e n t  people, or t o  t h e  same person 
a t  d i f f e t e n t  times? 1s i t  an i r r a t i o n a l  f o r c e  t h a t  knows no log ic?  
But t h e  chief  concern he re  is with another,  and f a r  deeper a spec t  
of moral i ty .  Many conscient ious people have become very concerned wi th  
t h e  p l i g h t  of t h e i r  less f o r t u n a t e  neighbors, both i n  t h e i r  own coun t r i e s  
and abroad, and have decided t o  devote a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e i r  
l ives t o  "doing good," by reducing poverty,  p o l l u t i o n ,  crime o r  urban 
sprawl. 
and s i n c e r e  people? 
Is it poss ib l e  t h a t  t h e r e  is an immoral aspect  of t hese  devoted 
i 
Is i t  immoral f o r  one man t o  decide what is good 
f o r  another ,  and t o  in f luence  decis ion makers t o  make t h e  "appropriate" 
changes? 
f i r s t  needs t o  be amplified and c l a r i f i e d .  
I t a k e  t h i s  t o  be a meaningful and s e r i o u s  quest ion,  which 
Although the  quest ion is 
addressed t o  a l l  those who devote a p a r t  of t h e i r  l ives t o  changing 
s o c i e t y  "for  t h e  good," p o l i t i c i a n s ,  managers, admin i s t r a to r s  and 
demonstrators,  I'll s i n g l e  ou t  one such group, t h e  planners,  f o r  s p e c i a l  
a t t e n t i o n ,  s i n c e  planners  work through ideas ,  and t h i s  essay is e s s e n t i a l l y  
an exp lo ra t ion  of i deas .  
It w i l l  be  seen, then, t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  of moral i ty  with which I a m  
concerned is no t  t h e  usua l  one of i d e n t i f y i n g  dishonesty o r  p o l i t i c a l  
co r rup t ion ,  or invasion of privacy, which I take t o  be  su r face  problems 
a r i s i n g  out  of ind iv idua l  dev ia t ions  from a recognized moral code. I 
a m  concerned wi th  what might be c a l l e d  "systemic mora l i t yo"  t h e  immorality 
t h a t  o r i g i n a t e s  from a d e s i r e  t o  steer t h e  s h i p  of state "for  t h e  good 
of a l l  
Now t h e r e  can b e  l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  mora l i t y  is  a mysterious idea  
of t h e  human race, and t h a t  t h e r e  are many d i v e r s e  opinions about i t s  
na tu re ,  opinions t h a t  are o f t e n  held with an i n c r e d i b l e  stubbornness. 
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Thus some p o s i t i v i s t s ,  l i k e  Ayer (1946), take it fo r  granted that 
moral u t t e r ances  are meaningless g run t s  of t h e  d i sg run t l ed ,  while  
o t h e r s  w i th  an equal  assurance say t h a t  moral laws are the  u n a l t e r a b l e  
word of God as revealed i n  some holy s c r i p t .  
I n  order  t o  o b t a i n  some b a s i s  f o r  t h e  following discussion,  I ' l l  
attempt t o  use  both t h e  con t r ibu t ions  of psychology and system planning 
t o  arrive a t  some hypotheses about t h e  na tu re  of moral i ty .  
end, I ' l l  begin by posing four  quest ions,  which i f  we could understand 
them b e t t e r  would cast some l i g h t  on the  moral confusions of our t i m e s .  
To t h i s  
The Basic Quest ions 
1. 
This quest ion t akes  a number of d i f f e r e n t  forms, but  a t  t h e  
o u t s e t  w e  can understand i ts  i n t e n t  by asking ourselves  whether, as w e  
humans gain knowledge of t h e  real world, we can thereby expect t o  
ga in  knowledge of t h e  moral world. Consider, f o r  example, t h e  awesome 
quest ion whether t h e  immensity of t h e  real universe  which we have come 
t o  apprec i a t e  i n  t h e  las t  few c e n t u r i e s  diminishes t o  zero t h e  i m -  
portance of moral i ty ,  Did man, i n  abdicat ing h i s  r o l e  as t he  c e n t e r  
of t h e  real universe ,  a l s o  abd ica t e  h i s  r o l e  as a moral being? To 
answer t h i s  quest ion i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  is  to  become r a t h e r  negat ive 
a t  t h e  very o u t s e t .  It i s  not  d i f f i c u l t  t o  po in t  out t h a t  t h e  immensity 
of t h e  universe  i s  of our own making; i t  is  more a f e e l i n g  than a 
sensa t ion ,  and may indeed be a moral f e e l i n g .  I n  any event,  i n  t h i s  
introductory d i scour se  I s h a l l  t a k e  it f o r  granted t h a t  moral i ty  is  
real and is immensely important, 
How are moral i ty  and r e a l i t y  r e l a t e d ?  
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2. What is the role of reason in our understanding 
of morality? 
Of course, this question depends a great deal on what we take 
reason to mean. If, for example, we were to equate reason to what 
Jung (1959) cal l s  the "rational" functions (thinking and feeling) then 
we might expect to find the answer readily at hand. All of us know 
by direct experience that when we are moved to moral utterances or 
moral behavior, intuition is playing a central role. Indeed, moral 
principles are often taken to be non-debatable (%on-negotiable" in 
today's world of student dissent), and this seems to imply that thinking 
by itself cannot be the determinant. 
about feeling, of course, but it would be a false move at the outset 
to expect that moral duty has its origin solely in the feeling function. 
We shall want to say some things 
The option I'll adopt is to equate "reason" with "scientific 
method," so that the question now becomes the question of the relation- 
ship between morality and science. Not that this option clarifies 
the question; if anything, given the confusion about what "the" 
scientific method is, the suggestion makes the question more complicated 
but perhaps at the same time more rewarding. 
3.  
As I said earlier, I am interested in the possible immorality of 
But I am also interested in the planner's 
How are morality and planning related? 
the conscientious planner. 
often implicit concept of morality, namely that if we plan for the 
appropriate goals, and act in accordance with the optimal plan, then 
we are acting morally. Sa the question is really a form of the older 
question whether the fully prudent society must not also be a moral 
society, for in truly lookfng after its own interests it must willy nilly 
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look a f t e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of a l l  o thers .  
In more s p e c i f i c  terms, I amiasking whether such e f f o r t s  as 
operat ions research ,  systems ana lys i s ,  urban and reg iona l  planning, 
t h e  development of "change agents," and s o  on,have created t h e  b a s i s  
f o r  human moral i ty .  
of p r u d e n t i a l i t y ,  as Bentham long ago suggested (1948). 
c rea t ion  moral, immoral, o r  amoral? 
They have indeed attempted t o  create a sc ience  
Is such a 
4 ,  What i s  t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  between moral i ty  and psychology? 
The "psychology" I a m  c h i e f l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i s  psychoanalysis,  and 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  Jung's ve r s ion  of i t ,  s i n c e  Jung and h i s  fol lowers  have 
spent  so much t i m e  on t h e  meaning of t h e  p a i r  good-and-evil, apair 
which presumably makes up t h e  f i b r e  of t h e  moral world. 
be i n t e r e s t e d  not  only i n  t h e  psychological cha rac t e r  of mora l i ty ,  
but a l so  i n  t h e  even more puzzling quest ion of t h e  moral cha rac t e r  
of psychology. 
Rut I s h a l l  
These are four  themes t h a t  w i l l  he lp  t o  cast some l i g h t  on the  
meaning of moral i ty ,  but  themes by themselves are r a the r  empty: they 
supplv the  p l o t  but no t  t h e  drama. The drama c o n s i s t s  of a cast of 
four  cha rac t e r s ,  w i t h  a number of subs id ia ry  walk-on p a r t s .  The 
charac te rs  are the  young P la to  of t h e  ea r ly ' d i a logues ,  t h e  mature Kant 
w r i t i n g  h i s  Cr i t i que  of Practical Reason, Edgar A .  Singer ,  and Jung. 
Singer  is  perhaps t h e  unknown of t h i s  cast;  he w a s  a s tudent  of William 
James, and, i n  my opinion, t h e  c r e a t o r  of t he  most comprehensive and 
p r e c i s e  philosophy of sc ience  of t h e  twent ie th  century.  
It i s  necessary,  however, t o  say something about t he  dramatic 
s t y l e  of t h e  dialogue between these  charac te rs .  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  providing a scho la r ly  appra i sa l  of t h e  wr i t i ngs  of each 
I a m  c e r t a i n l y  not  
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of these  men on t h e  sub jec t  of moral i ty .  Rather,  I want t o  use t h e i r  
words as responses t o  t h e  quest ions j u s t  posed, and i n  seve ra l  cases I ' l l  
go w e l l  beyond what each has s a i d  t o  what I i n f e r  from t h e i r  s ta tements .  
Thus t h e  dialogue is  a kind of s t o r y  i n  which the  fou r  d iscuss  moral i ty .  
Now each of t h e  charac te rs  p1ays:a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  r o l e ,  The 
young P l a t o ' s  r o l e  is t o  he lp  us  understand b e t t e r  the/four  quest ions 
meaning of the 
by providing us  with t h e  clearest ,  s imples t  and most o p t i m i s t i c  answers. 
Flis is t h e  voice of  enthusiasm. Kant is t h e  c e n t r a l  charac te r ,  and h i s  
to r tuous  experience i n  w r i t i n g  t h e  Second Cr i t i que  is b o t h ' t h e  psycho- 
l o g i c a l  and phi losophica l  episode t h e  s t o r y  seeks t o  descr ibe.  
quest ions were t h e  burning i s s u e s  of t h i s  Cr i t ique .  
A l l  f ou r  
Singer p lays  the  
r o l e  of a modern Kantian providing t h e  arguments f o r  equat ing mora l i ty  
and t h e  sc ience  of p ruden t i a l i t y .  Jung, of course,  g ives  us  t h e  i n s i g h t s  
regarding psychology and moral i ty .  
Before I begin t h e  drama, I need t o  do one o ther  tFing required 
of drama producers: I need t o  adver t ize .  I have t o  say who I th ink  
my audience w i l l  be. It c e r t a i n l y  includes t h e  psychologis ts ,  who are 
bound to  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  good-and-evil, i t s  o r i g i n ,  i ts  mani fes ta t ion ,  
i t s  r o l e  i n  t he  psyche; most psychologis ts  would agree w i t h  Jung t h a t  
t he re  is very much t h a t  w e  don ' t  know about t h i s  subjec t .  
Xemories (1963) recalls how the d e v i l  whispered i n  h i s  ear not  t o  mention 
t h e  then unpopular Freud when he w a s  publ ishing h i s  e a r l y  papers about 
Jung i n  h i s  
h i s  experiments on a s soc ia t ion .  The ques t ion  of t h e  na ture  of t h a t  
whispering d e v i l  never disappeared i n  Jung's wr i t i ngs ,  and t o  t h e  las t  
remained one of t h e  deepest  myster ies  of Jungian thought. 
A s  I remarked a t  the  o u t s e t ,  my audience should include a l l  those 
concerned with today 's  d i s s e n t ,  because t h e  d i s s e n t  of youth is moral 
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i n  character :  t h e  d i s s e n t e r s  be l i eve  i n  courage, f a i r n e s s  t o  a l l  people 
r ega rd le s s  of race, honesty, and they have a hea l thy  abhorrence of 
hypocrisy. Many of them are claiming t h a t  t h e i r  pa ren t s '  generat ion 
l o s t  its moral i ty  i n  i ts  greedy p u r s u i t  of aff luence.  Well, i f  w e  d i d ,  
then t h e  more r e f l e c t i v e  among them and t h e i r  e l d e r s  need t o  understand 
what it i s  t h a t  w e  l o s t  and how it  is  t h a t  w e  can f i n d  it again. The 
do-gooders, managers and planners ,  are a l s o  t o  be i n  t h e  audience,of 
course. 
P l a t o  
So the  p o t e n t i a l  audience is  l a r g e  and motley. I f  t he  few t h a t  
turned up w i l l  be sea t ed ,  we can begin. 
We begin t h e  dialogue with P l a t o  i n  t h e  Phaedo, who inhe r i t ed  
from Socrates ,  Pythagoras, and o t h e r s  t h e  d o c t r i n e  t h a t  r e a l i t y  is t o  
be found fundamentally i n  ideas ,  a d o c t r i n e  our hardheaded th inke r s  of 
today tend t o  scorn without bother ing t o  r e f l e c t  on i t s  meanfng. 
has only been r e c e n t l y  t h a t  some mathematicians, l i k e  GGdel, have 
come out  s t rong ly  f o r  t h e  P la ton ic  d o c t r i n e ,  arguing t h a t  numbers have 
a r e a l i t y  i n  and of themselves, and are not  derived from conventional 
axioms, as so many mathematicians b e l i e v e  without r e f l e c t i o n .  It i s  
c e r t a i n l y  a valid specu la t ion  t h a t  P l a ton ic  ideal ism w i l l  never d i e ,  
any more than w i l l  t h e  materialism of h i s  phi losophical  enemy Democritus. 
For our purpose, P l a t o ' s  theory of i deas  provides a coherent and 
It 
simple answer t o  t h e  fou r  quest ions already posed: 
1. How are mora l i t y  and r e a l i t y  r e l a t e d ?  The answer is t h a t  t h e  
good i s  an idea ,  indeed t h e  pinnacle  of a l l  i deas ,  and hence is real. 
Xoral ac t ions  are "simulations" of t he  idea  of t h e  Good, much as a com- 
pu te r  program i s  a s imulat ion of some organizat ion.  
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2. What is t h e  r o l e  qf reason i n  moral i ty? Reason, says P l a t o ,  
can be in t e rp re t ed  as t h e  process by which t h e  mind (psyche) comes t o  
l ea rn  t h a t  which i n  some priior s t a t e  it a l ready  knew. The prokess is 
d i a l e c t i c a l ,  and P la to  i l l u s t r a t e s  i t  over and over as Socrates  d is -  
courses with Athenian youth on t h e  meaning of courage o r  f r iendship ,  
o r  t he  proof of geometrical  theorems. There is no clear d e f i n i t i o n  of 
t h i s  d i a l e c t i c a l  process e i t h e r  i n  P l a t o  o r  t h e  later commentators. 
Furthermore, t h e r e  is a deep mystery about i t s  b a s i c  assumption, namely, 
how the  mind can know something and y e t  n o t  know i t ,  a mystery t h a t  is  
very pe r t inen t  t o  our d iscuss ion  and w i l l  have t o  be  explored. 
3. How are mora l i ty  and planning r e l a t e d ?  I f  planning means 
seeking one 's  own p leasure  t o  t h e  exclusion of t h e  good, then t h e  two 
are opposi tes ;  t he  s e l f i s h l y  prudent man o r  s o c i e t y ,  according t o  
t h e  Phaedo, must expect an a f t e r l i f e  i n  some kind of h e l l ,  o r  i n  some 
loirer form of l i f e  
4 .  What is  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between mora l i ty  and psychology? P l a t o ' s  
theory of t h e  psyche, i n  t h e  e a r l y  dialogues,  is  l a r g e l y  to ld  i n  t h e  
form of myths, 
r e a l i t y ,  and hence knows t h e  ideas ,  but  when encased i n  a body a g rea t  
dea l  of i t s  o r i g i n a l  psychic power i s  l o s t .  I n  genera l ,  t he  r e l a t ion -  
sh ip  between moral i ty  and psychology i s  explained i n  t h e  accounts i n  
the  Phaedo o r  Republic, of t h e  sou l ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  the  world of ideas. 
Thus mora l i ty  (as  represented by t h e  idea  of t h e  Good) is  e s s e n t i a l l y  
above and independent of t h e  psyche, which i t  shapes. Morali ty i n  t h e  
shape of t he  v i r t u e s  
but r a t h e r  psychological processes are mani fes ta t ions  of mora l i ty .  
Every sou l  has had t h e  opportuni ty  of viewing pure 
i s  not  a mani fes ta t ion  of psychological processes ,  
! 
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For today's s tuden t  of psychology, t h i s  P l a ton ic  theory may appear 
as quaint  as t h e  no t ion  t h a t  numbqrs are real appears t o  today's mathe- 
matician.  
as a being independent of our  own minds? 
l a w  of God, t h e  idea  becomes reasonable. 
many t reatments  of good-and-evil, both of which can be conceived as 
reali t ies e x i s t i n g  independently of our own minds, and thus one could 
t rea t  moral i ty  as t h e  fo rce  used by good t o  combat evi l .  Rut t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would c e r t a i n l y  f a i l  t o  capture  P l a t o ' s  concept. 
Is it poss ib l e  t o  imagine t h a t  moral i ty  e x i s t s  "out there",  
O f  course,  i f  moral i ty  is t h e  
W e  can also think of Jung's 
I n  
Jung, good-and-evil are c o r r e l a t i v e s :  n e i t h e r  has  meaning without t h e  
o the r ,  and both are "equally" real. But i n  P l a t o ,  t he  idea  of t he  Good 
does not e x i s t  because t h e r e  is a l so  an idea  of Ev i l .  
i s  a negation, a l a c k  of completeness. Hence P la ton ic  Ev i l  is  much 
more l i k e  the  Jungian not ion of t h e  incomplete self. Indeed, were 
P la to  t o  be reborn as a Jungian s tuden t ,  he would see i n  Jung's concern 
f o r  t h e  "completion" of t h e  s e l f  a clear manifestat ion of t h e  idea  of 
t h e  Good. 
t o r t u r e s  and joys of analysis? ' '  is "Because thereby you l e a r n  t h e  i d e a  
of t he  Good." To ask why one should l e a r n  t h e  idea of t h e  Good, i s  t o  
ask a quest ion which provides i t s  own answer d i r e c t l y :  t h i s  is what 
"should" means e 
Evi l ,  says P l a t o ,  
The answer t o  the quest ion "Why should I go through the  
Whether Jung f e e l s  s a t i s f i e d  with t h e  young P l a t o ' s  conclusions 
remains an open quest ion,  cven t o  t h e  end of these  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  For 
Jung, t he  quest ion is  whether t h e  d e s i r e  t o  l e a r n  about the s e l f ,  t o  
f ind self completion, o r i g i n a t e s  from a moral fo rce .  Is t h e  Soc ra t i c  
"know thyse l f "  a moral law? I f  so ,  where did i t  come from? 
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We can leave t h i s  quest ion f o r  t h e  t i m e  being, i n  order  t o  look 
more deeply i n t o  P l a t o ' s  g r e a t  mystery; how can a mind both know and 
not know something a t  t h e  same t i m e ?  I n  t h e  e a r l y  dialbgues,  t h e  youths 
i n c o r r e c t l y  answer Socrates '  quest ions about t h e  meaning of a v i r t u e  
l i k e  courage. Hence t h e y ' d o n ' t  know what "courage" means. And y e t  
when Socrates po in t s  ou t  a d i f f i c u l t y  i n  t h e i r  proposed d e f i n i t i o n ,  they 
recognize the  d i f f i c u l t y ,  and i n  e f f e c t  propose a "bet ter"  d e f i n i t i o n .  
Hence they do know what courage means, i n  some sense.  The myths of t h e  
Phaedo and Republic, r e f e r r e d  t o  earlier, t r y  t o  explain how t h i s  
happened, how the  t r u e  idea  of t h e  v i r t u e  w a s  fo rgo t t en .  
Now t h e r e  may seem t o  be no mystery t o  P l a t o ' s  doc t r ine  a t  a l l ,  
because remembering and f o r g e t t i n g  are among t h e  most common experiences.  ~ 
I once learned how t o  extract a square r o o t .  
look up t h e  method i n  a t e x t ,  I w i l l  be rkminded. 
and don ' t  know how t o  extract a square root .  
Now I ' v e  forgot ten.  I f  I 
Hence I both know 
What is t h e  mystery? 
The mystery l ies n o t  so much i n  t h e  meaning of a submerged un- 
conscious knowledge, as i n  t h e  meaning of t h e  "supermerged" conscious 
mind. Analogies seem t o  be t h e  only method w e  have of explaining t h e  
idea  t h a t  a p i ece  of knowledge hidden i n  t h e  unconscious i s  "drawn up'' 
t o  consciousness. Thus w e  t h ink  of icebergs,  wells, mines, computer 
memories, t o  h e l p  exp la in  t h i s  very mysterious idea  of becoming aware 
of t h a t  which we a l ready know. 
t o  concentrate  on explaining the  unconscious, t h e  p a r t  of t h e  iceberg 
underneath t h e  su r face ,  t he  depths  of the water i n  t h e  w e l l ,  and so on. 
But what is t h i s  o t h e r  p a r t ,  t he  conscious mind? And how i s  i t  poss ib l e  
t h a t  t h e  conscious mind is no t  aware of what t h e  unconscious mind knows? 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, t he  analogy seems 
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The quest ion is  a very s e r i o u s  one, because as w e  s h a l l  see,, a l l  
four  cha rac t e r s  of ou r  drama, as w e l l  as almost everyone else who has 
thought about t h e  matter, agree t h a t  t he  conscious mind " l i s t e n s  t o  t h e  
voice of morali ty." I f  t h i s  is  so, then c l e a r l y  w e  are as obliged t o  
exp la in  the  l i s t e n e r  as w e  are t o  exp la in  what is  l i s t e n e d  to .  I do no t  
mean t o  deny t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  r i c h  l i t e r a t u r e  on repression and o t h e r  
mechanisms of f o r g e t t i n g ,  Indeed, some recen t  work by D r .  Kenneth Colby 
a t  Stanford Universi ty  shows how one can design a computer program i n  
such a way t h a t  i t  suppresses information fed i n t o  it because of an in- 
duced "anxiety complex." Such a s imulat ion provides a very precise 
answer t o  my quest ion,  because "conscious mind" is  what t h e  computer 
p r i n t s  out  as a r e s u l t  of a query one makes t o  i t ,  while "unconscious 
mind" is what t h e  computer programmer knows i s  s to red  i n  computer memory 
i n  some form. But i t  is  p rec i se ly  because most s tuden t s  of psychology 
(psychoanalysis) would reject t h i s  p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t he  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  between conscious and unconscious mind t h a t  my quest ion needs more 
a t t e n t i o n .  This w i l l  have t o  come la ter ,  a f t e r  we have explored 
moral i ty  i n  more depth. 
Kant -
Our next episode shows Kant a t  t h a t  period i n  h i s  l i f e  when he w a s  
w r i t i n g  h i s  second C r i t i q u e  of P r a c t i c a l  Reason, which dea l s  pr imari ly  
with moral i ty  and which w i l l  be depicted as a deep and troublesome event 
i n  Kant's thoughts, Some background of t h e  drama i s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  order  
t o  understand i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  Kant 's  i n t e l l e c t u a l  l i f e .  
been brought up i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of Leibniz,  which i t s e l f  followed t h e  
Kant had 
g r e a t  t r a d i t i o n  of ra t ional ism.  Not only does reason dominate the  
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world, but reason r e s i d e s  C i t h i n  each of us  i n  such a manner t h a t  w e  
can eventual ly  expect t o  unravel t he  deepest mysteries of t h e  world. 
I n  Leibniz,  reason is capable of t e l l i n g  u s  whether Cod ex i s t s  (He does) ,  
what t he  fundamental na tu re  of r e a l i t y  must be,  how God designed 
t h e  b e s t  of a l l  poss ib l e  worlds. According t o  Kant, i t  was t h a t  im- 
placable  Scotchman David Hume who awakened him from h i s  dogmatic 
slumbers, because Hume argued convincingly t h a t  man only learns from 
experience,  and with such a teacher  he cannot expect t o  l e a r n  the  bas i c  
secrets of t h e  universe ,  if t h e r e  are any. 
dictment of  r a t iona l i sm is his a t t a c k  on t h e  i d e a  of c a u s a l i t y .  
r a t i o n a l i s t s  believed t h a t  t h e  world is  made up of causes,  t h a t  A 
causes B, and is  caused by C ,  and so on. Spinoza, i n  f a c t ,  bel ieved 
t h a t  t h e  events  of t h e  world follow i n  sequence with the  same f o r c e  
with which a theorem of geometry follows from the  pos tu l a t e s .  
Hume's most t e l l i n g  in- 
A l l  
But, says Hume, exp la in  t o  m e  how experience could ever have 
taught us t h a t  one event causes another? Oh, you say, i t  teaches m e  
by r e p e t i t i o n .  Every c h i l d  "learns" t h a t  flames are hot  and "cause" 
pain,  so  t h a t  a f t e r  awhile he does not touch t h e  flame. Not so, says 
Hume. What t he  ch i ld  has learned is  t h a t  every t i m e  i t  touches t h e  
flame, a ho t  and p a i n f u l  s ensa t ion  occursr  Rut i t  cannot have 
"learned" t h a t  t h i s  sequence of events  - w i l l  occur,  because experience 
i s  s i l e n t  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  fu tu re .  Some of the  audience may f i n d  
t h i s  p i ece  of phi losophical  argument a b i t  s t r ange ,  but  i t  is  a very 
important one f o r  psychology. Imagine, for example, what would happen 
t o  Jungian theory i f  c a u s a l i t y  were t o  drop out  of i t .  
th ings ,  we would be forced t o  be thoroughly s c e p t i c a l  about t he  concept 
Among o the r  
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of what Jung c a l l s  t h e  archetypal  i n f luence ,  because t h e  idea t h a t  
archetypes in f luence  unconscious behavior is  based on a causa l  model. 
It is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  no te  t h a t  Hume was forced t o  generate  a 
b i t  of psychological theory himsel,f, t o  exp la in  how it happens t h a t  
1 
most of us do b e l i e v e  i n  causa l  f o r c e s ,  i f  i n  fact  w e  never learned 
of t h e i r  ex i s t ence  through experience. H i s  theory is an e a r l y  ve r s ion  
of t h e  "conditioned response": 
"A then B" l eads  t o  a conditioning of t he  mind t o  expect B when A 
appears. I might no te  i n  passing t h a t  Hume i s  thus dr iven t o  introduce 
a b i t  of c a u s a l i t y  himself a t  a higher  level,  s i n c e  he ev iden t ly  
means t h a t  t h e  appearance of A causes the  expectat ion of B i n  t h e  
mind of t h e  conditioned individual .  But philosophers,  l i k e  everyone 
else i n  t h i s  world, tend t o  be c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t  a t  t i m e s ;  
otherwise,  they couldn ' t  be  creative. 
frequent experience of the sequence 
It w a s  Kant's g r e a t  i n s i g h t  t o  see t h a t  "learning from experience" 
i s  not simple, but is  r a t h e r  a highly complex psychological phenomenon. 
It is  t r u e ,  says Kant, t h a t  t he  mind does receive impressions through 
sensa t ion ,  but  t hese  would remain wholly meaningless i f  t he  mind 
were no t  ab le  t o  shape them i n t o  an i n t e l l i g i b l e  form. 
f o r  Kant is a combination of two essential  ing red ien t s ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
sensuous i n t u i t i o n  - and t h e  forms supplied by t h e  mind, which f o r  Kant 
Thus "experience" 
w e  space,  t i m e  and t h e  "categories." It is  t o  be noted t h a t  Jung 
gives  Kant c r e d i t  f o r  one of t h e  earliest i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  archetypes,  
f o r  t h e  ca t egor i e s  are un ive r sa l ly  "in" a l l  minds, and presumably i n  
an anthropological  o r  genecic theory (which Kant does not develop) are 
i n h e r i t e d ,  
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The ca t egor i e s  i n  e f f e c t  make experience i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  so t h a t ,  
among o the r  t h ings ,  w e  humans are a b l e  t o  t a l k  about i t .  I f  I can 
say,  "This is a n  apple, ' '  I 've made use  of an amazing assortment of 
concepts ( ca t egor i e s ) .  The s u b j e c t ,  " this ,"  assumes t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some 
individuated o b j e c t  i n  space, which has a u n i t y ,  a substance,  and is 
r e l a t e d  t o  o t h e r  o b j e c t s  of my perception. Furthermore, t he  "is" 
asserts t h a t  t h e  apple  is  real. F ina l ly ,  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h i s  simple 
a s s e r t i o n  is  t h e  not ion t h a t  experiencing an apple  is taking p l ace  
wi th in  one mind. Kant ca l l s  t h i s  l a t h -  very mysterious happening, t h e  
" t ranscendental  un i ty  of apperception." To psychologis ts ,  t h i s  idea of 
c o l l e c t i n g  of t h e  manifold p a r t s  of experience under one un i f i ed  
consciousness is a s i g n i f i c a n t  h i s t o r i c a l  event ,  because Kant s a w  i t  as 
t h e  primary func t ion  of  t h e  "egoe'' Thus with one g igan t i c  e f f o r t ,  Kant 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  between the  ego and t h e  s e l f ,  a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  no t  
poss ib l e  wi th in  t h e  earlier empi r i c i s t  school of John Locke. 
is t h e  instrument whereby t h e  var ious elements of experience are 
un i f i ed  i n  one s e l f .  
The ego 
For t h e  present  purposes I am more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  ca t egor i e s  
than i n  t h e  ego, and e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  category of causa l i t y .  Kant, i n  
his 'kheory of archetypes, ' '  had an answer t o  Hume, namely, t h a t  l i n k i n g  
events o r  o b j e c t s  together  by causal  l a w  is  an archetypal  process,  
abso lu t e ly  e s s e n t i a l  i f  experience is  t o  become i n t e l l i g i b l e .  H e  argues 
f o r  t h i s  i dea  i n  va r ious  ways, bu t  perhaps t h e  most convincing is t h a t  
a13 minds must be a b l e  t o  " te l l  time," i .e . ,  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a 
p a s t ,  p re sen t ,  and f u t u r e .  They could no t  do t h i s  i f  they d i d  not  
have an i n b u i l t  c lock,  because the  flow of time is t o  be recognized 
only by such a psychological clock. Material c locks,  i n  f a c t ,  are 
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r ep resen ta t ions  of t h e  b a s i c  psychological c locks each of u s  has  w i t h i n  
him z p r i o r i .  But c locks ope ra t e  i n  accordance with causa l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
and s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  accordance wi th  mechanical l a w .  
l e a r n  about causa l  l inkages through experience,  but  r a t h e r  w e  assume 
causal  l inkages i n  order  t o  t e l l  t i m e ,  and w e  need t o  t e l l  time i n  
order  f o r  our experiences t o  be i n t e l l i g i b l e .  
dictum, "We should no t  have found r e g u l a r i t y  i n  na tu re ,  had w e  not  f i r s t  
put i t  there." 
(1968) calls  t h e  "tendency" toward pa t t e rn ing  and order i n  matter and 
i n  t h e  psyche is as much an aspect  of t h e  observer f o r  Kant as i t  is of 
the o u t s i d e  o r  i n s i d e  world. 
ously d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i s c e r n  what t h e  observer has  put i n t o  t h e o r i e s  
( p a t t e r n s )  and what he has  "discovered." 
Hence, we do not  
Thus Kant's famous 
It is t o  be  noted i n  t h i s  regard t h a t  what Osterman 
Indeed, f o r  a neo-Kantian i t  i s  tremend- 
This r a t h e r  b r i e f  account of many lengthy arguments of Kant's 
f i r s t  C r i t i q u e  of Pure Reason w i l l  have t o  s u f f i c e  f o r  t he  moment 
without our a t tempting f u r t h e r  defense,  i n  order  t o  b r ing  out  as quickly 
as poss ib l e  why c a u s a l i t y  is so important with r e spec t  t o  moral i ty  i n  
Kant. 
t he  " t ranscendental  d i a l e c t i c . "  It was h i s  content ion t h a t  t h e  human 
mind has  a natural  tendency t o  extend Reason beyond the  domain where 
i t  is intended t o  work, i.e., beyond i ts  proper domain of organizing 
sensa t ions  i n  an i n t e l l i g i b l e  manner. J u s t  why t h e  mind l i k e s  t o  do t h i s  
kind of th ing  would b e  a f a s c i n a t i n g  quest ion f o r  a Kantian psychologist  
t o  explore,  b u t  Kant merely takes i t  f o r  granted t h a t  a t tempts  t o  s t e p  
beyond t h e  proper l i m i t s  of Reason H e  c e r t a i n l y  had 
plenty of empir ical  evidence f o r  h i s  content ion,  considering how many 
of h i s  contemporary philosophers on t h e  Continent were engaged i n  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  Cr i t i que  Kant devotes a s e c t i o n  t o  what he calls  
a l l  t oo  human. 
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metaphysical specu la t ions  which used Reason t o  explore the  non-phenomenal 
world a 
I n  o rde r  t o  show t h e  f u t i l i t y  of t r y i n g  t o  apply Reason t o  t h e  
non-sensuous areas of i nqu i ry ,  Kant developed a number of "antinomies." 
H i s  purpose was t o  show t h a t  equal ly  s t rong ,  convincing arguments can 
be made f o r  opposi te  theses.  Consider, f o r  example, t he  quest ion of 
whether t he  world had a beginning i n  time, o r  whether i t  has always 
ex i s t ed .  The quest ion,  I might note ,  is  no t  t h e  same as the  one t h a t  
now concerns cosmologists,  i r e o ,  whether t h e r e  was a "Big Bang" t h a t  
exploded t h e  universe  i n t o  ga l ax ie s ,  nebulae, quazars,  and t h e  l i k e ,  
because the  Big Bang theory assumes t h a t  something ex i s t ed  be fo re  t h e  
Bang. 
i n  t i m e ,  H i s  po in t  is t h a t  Reason cannot appropr i a t e ly  a d d r e s s , i t s e l f  
t o  such a quest ion,  because t h e  sub jec t  of t h e  quest ion lies beyond 
the  scope of experience,  which is t h e  only proper domain i n  which Reason 
does i t s  work. 
such a quest ion,  i t  runs smack i n t o  paradox: 
w e l l  be defended. Thus Kant introduced t h e  phi losophical  shocker of 
h i s  t i m e :  l i m i t a t i o n s  on Reason. Of course,  t h i s  w a s  only shocking 
t o  h i s  r a t i o n a l i s t  contemporaries. Today, as happens t o  most c r e a t i v e  
ideas ,  i t  is a p l a t i t u d e  t o  say t h a t  human reason is  l imited.  We are 
even proud of t h e  r o l e  t h a t  non-reason plays i n  our  l ives.  It would be  
shocking t o  suggest t h a t  reason is  n o t  bounded after a l l ,  although much 
can be s a i d  i n  defense of such a t h e s i s ,  
Rather,  Kant's quest ion is whether t h e  real world had a beginning 
And when t h e  human mind does t r y  t o  apply Reason t o  
both answers can equal ly  
For our present  i n t e r e s t ,  i t  was Kant 's  t h i r d  antinomy which is  
t h e  most important. The t h e s i s  and a n t i t h e s i s  are as follows: 
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Thesis: The c a u s a l i t y  which has i ts  o r i g i n  i n  t h e  l a w s  of Nature 
is not  t h e  only c a u s a l i t y  which ope ra t e s  i n  t h e  phenomenal 
world. There is a l s o  t h e  c a u s a l i t y  of freedom of choice 
which is required t o  exp la in  f u l l y  cer ta in  phenomena. 
An t i thes i s :  There is  no freedom of choice; r a t h e r  a l l  events  i n  t h e  
world happen s o l e l y  i n  terms of t h e  laws of nature .  
The "equally fo rce fu l "  arguments f o r  t h e  t h e s i s  and a n t i t h e s i s  which 
Kant gives  are of some i n t e r e s t  h i s t o r i c a l l y .  
dec l a re s  t h a t  freedom of choice i s  required t o  explain events ,  depends 
on showing t h a t  every event r equ i r e s  a cause t o  explain i ts  occurrence,  
and t h i s  cause i n  t u r n  r e q i i r e s  another cause; t h e  chase up t h e  chain 
of causes cannot go on forever ,  because otherwise w e  never  have a 
complete causal expxanation, which is what is required if t he  category 
of c a u s a l i t y  i s  t o  make experience i n t e l l i g i b l e .  
of a l l  t h e  arguments which people use t o  prove t h a t  they have f r e e  
w i l l s ,  Kant chooses t h e  pu re ly  l o g i c a l  deduction from t h e  concept of 
completeness. H e  has t o  do t h i s  because of h i s  meaning of "pure 
reason." The consequence is t h a t  even i f  you w e r e  t o  agree with t h e  
t h e s i s ,  i t  could have small psychological so l ace  f o r  you, because it 
by no means s a y s  t h a t  you are f r e e  t o  choose spontaneously. 
The t h e s i s ,  which 
You w i l l  no t e  t h a t  
, 
The s p i r i t  of t h e  argciment f o r  t h e  a n t i t h e s i s  can bes t  be captured 
i n  some l a t e r  h i s t o r y  of t h e  nineteenth century,  i n  t h e  almost b i t t e r  
debate over determinism and vitalism. The v i t a l i s t s ,  many of whom 
were b i o l o g i s t s ,  never seemed t o  understand why t h e i r  not ion of spon- 
taneous choice,  o r  of a f o r c e  t h a t  ope ra t e s  through a b a s i s  o t h e r  than 
mechanical l a w ,  evoked such s t rong  opposit ion.  The same kind of 
puzzlement occurs today i n  t h e  case of extrasensory perception. Why 
are s o  many psychologis ts  almost v i o l e n t l y  opposed t o  the idea? The 
19 
i 
answer i s  q u i t e  simple: i f  you introduce pure spontanei ty  of choice,  
o r  fo rces  t h a t  create percept ions but  c a n ' t  be sensed, then you r u i n  
t h e  e n t i r e  game of science.  
D e  Rerum Natura. H e  bel ieved t h a t  i f  a l l  atoms behaved i n  a determinis- 
t i c  manner, then they would a l l  f a l l  fo reve r  in p a r a l l e l  l i n e s .  
exp la in  how they c o l l i d e ,  which experience te l ls  us  they obviously do, 
This i s  why Lucret ius  is  so naive i n  h i s  
To 
he i n j e c t e d  i n t o  some of them a t i n y  b i t  of freedom t o  dev ia t e  from 
t h e i r  chosen path.  By so doing, he completely ruined t h e  f i n e  atomic 
model which Leucippus and Democritus constructed.  Why? Because now 
t h e  p h y s i c i s t  must state h i s  laws i n  terms of an i n t o l e r a b l e  q u a l i f i c a -  
t i on :  
Lucret ius '  f r e e  atoms is  about,  o r  except when t h e r e  i s  an e'lan v i t a l  
i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y ,  o r  except when an unsensed fo rce  is  coming through. 
And how do w e  know when one of t h e s e  th ings  i s  happening? 
ponents of freedom and extrasensory perception say t h a t  we c a n ' t  
know; i f  w e  d id  know then we'd know what caused t h e  freedom o r  what 
caused the  extrasensory percept ion,  i n  which case freedom is no longer 
f r e e ,  and extrasensory percept ion is no longer e x t r a .  The violence 
of t h e  de t e rmin i s t ,  h i s  scorn and d e r i s i o n ,  are rooted irr h i s  heal thy 
psychological response t o  t h e  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  a n t i c s  of people who t r y  
to r u i n  o the r  people 's  l i ve l ihoods  and act as though they were unaware 
of it! 
the  l a w  of g r a v i t a t i o n  holds  un ive r sa l ly  except when one of 
--
The pro- 
For Kant, then,  both t h e s i s  and a n t i t h e s i s  can be defended by an 
equal ly  s t rong  arguments though I a m  inc l ined  t o  think t h a t  t h e  a n t i -  
t h e s i s  runs away with t h e  honors. But f o r  t h e  moment, suppose w e  
accept Kant's argument thal Reason alone cannot address  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  
quest ion of whether t h e r e  is such a th ing  as f r e e  w i l l .  A t  t h i s  po in t ,  
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one should say  t h a t  "pure" Reason cannot do so, because as w e  s h a l l  see 
Kant had another kind of Reason, t h e  "p rac t i ca l , "  wai t ing behind t h e  
scenes t o  come on i n  t h e  next act. Within t h e  domain of experience,  
c a u s a l i t y  is  always a t  work, l i n k i n g  toge the r  a l l  events  i n  a r egu la r ,  
and hence determined manner. Hence, as f a r  as experienced human be- 
havior is  concernedp a l l  behavior is  determined i n  p r i n c i p l e .  Behavioral 
science i s  b a s i c a l l y  de t e rmin i s t i c  f o r  Kant. 
Thus it  might seem t h a t  Kant had once and f o r  a l l  put moral i ty  
and f r e e  w i l l  ou t s ide  h i s  philosophy. I f  t h e  f i r s t  Cr i t i que  explains  
how men come t o  know, then one must conclude t h a t  they can never come 
t o  know anything about f r e e  w i l l ,  and t h a t  i f  moral i ty  r equ i r e s  freedom 
of choice,  
evidence can ever clear up. 
why then mora l i t y  too i s  a b a s i c  mystery t h a t  no amount of 
And y e t  i t  was f a r  from Kant 's  i n t e n t  t o  leave matters i n  t h i s  
shape. Indeed, t h e  f i r s t  Cr i t i que  i t s e l f  provides a p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  
saving moral i ty .  I n  t h e  Cr i t i que ,  Kant is mainly concerned with t h e  
phenomenal world, which is  a world constructed ou t  of sensuous in- 
t u i t i o n s  and t h e  - a p r i o r i  forms and ca t egor i e s .  
world, where events happen i n  a regulated manner, 
e a s i l y  see t h a t  t h e r e  oould be o the r  worlds, which Kant calls  "noumenal." 
One such world is  t h e  purely i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  where Reason alone pre- 
dominates. "Things" can happen i n  t h i s  world t o o ,  i f  it ex is t s ,  and 
t h e  th ings  t h a t  happen need no t  i n  any way i n t e r f e r e  with t h e  phenomenal 
wor Id  e 
This is  a very real 
But Reason can 
Thus Kant bel ieved t o  h i s  own s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  he  had reconci led 
t h e  problem of freedom and determinism which i n e v i t a b l y  plagues every 
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philosopher who wants t o  preserve both mora l i ty  and sc ience  i n  h i s  
system. 
such a b i f u r c a t i o n  of pos i t ions .  The l o g i c a l  p o s i t i v i s t s ,  s t rong  
admirers of sc ience ,  are gene ra l ly  q u i t e  willing--indeed eager-to 
g ive  up mora l i ty  i n  any absolu te  sense of t h e  term. 
moral u t t e r ances  as meaningless grunts  of d i sg run t l ed  humans. On t h e  
o ther  hand, t h e  more l i t e r a r y  phi losophers ,  who see l i t t l e  o r  no good 
i n  t h e  game of sc ience ,  f i n d  no d i f f i c u l t y  whatsoever i n  giving up 
sc ience  and i t s  need f o r  r e g u l a r i t y  i n  Nature; they can c r e a t e  a world 
of freedom without a b lush  of h e s i t a t i o n .  
The problem expla ins  why i n  contemporary philosophy w e  f i n d  
They "expfain" 
But t h e  problem is a severe  one f o r  any th inke r  who wants t o  
keep both sc ience  and moral i ty .  This d e s i r e  is t h e  one t h a t  holds  
f o r  a l l  four  of t h e  heroes  of t h i s  essay,  and i t  makes t h e  c e n t r a l  
theme of our d iscuss ion .  P l a to ,  Kant, Singer ,  and Jung were a l l  con- 
vinced of the  u l t i m a t e  value of sc ience  and of t h e  r e a l i t y  of mora l i ty .  
None are w i l l i n g  t o  make unexplained except ions i n  the  world of regu- 
l a r i t y  i n  order  t o  sneak i n  a b i t  of freedom he re  and there .  
a l l  abso lu t e ly  committed t o  t h e  soundness of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  metkod. 
P l a t o  had t h e  easiest t a sk ,  because f o r  him s c i e n t i f i c  method i n  i t s  
pures t  form (eOg . ,  i n  geometry) dea l s  wi th  i d e a s ,  and t h e r e  i s  no 
t roub le  whatsoever i n  having the  idea  of t h e  Good coexis t  wi th  a l l  t h e  
They are 
o the r  ideas .  There is ,  of course,  t he  ques t ion  of whether t h e  s o u l  
is free i n  P l a t o ' s  philosophy; i n  the  myths it does appear t o  have 
f r e e  choice,  and one is l ed  t o  wonder how a world dominated by the  Good 
would permit an immoral choice,  
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It w a s  Kant who enunciated t h e  problem of: science and mora l i t y  
i n  t h e  modern form, where s c i e n t i f i c  method means t h e  use of observat ion 
t o  l e a r n  about t h e  n a t u r a l  (phenomenal) world. 
Kant a l s o  r e a l i z e d  what many contemporary philosophers and psychologis ts  
s t i l l  f a i l  t o  see, namely, t h a t  observat ion r equ i r e s  a f i rm adherence 
t o  t h e  not ion of r e g u l a r i t y  i n  Nature. The s c i e n t i s t  is not someone 
who hopes t o  f ind  r e g u l a r i t y ,  o r  who should be amazed to discover  that it 
exists. Rather, h e  must assume t h a t  Nature behaves accarding t o  s t r i c t  
laws, because otherwise he cannot observe. 
assumption of r e g u l a r i t y ,  he could no t  c a l i b r a t e  h i s  instruments ,  and 
without c a l i b r a t i o n  t h e  whole f a b r i c  of con t ro l l ed  observat ion d i s i n t e -  
g r a t e s  i n t o  i n t e l l e c t u a l  dus t .  One should note  that the Kantian p o s i t i o n  
is not changed one b i t  by modern quantum mechanics; t h e  determinism 
of s ta t i s t ica l  l a w  is j u s t  as r i g i d  as t h e  determinism of c lass ical  
mechanics. 
Rut w e  have seen t h a t  
For example, without t h e  
On t h e  o the r  hand, Kant w a s  equal ly  convinced t h a t  a free w i l l  does 
e x i s t ,  and because i t  does, t h a t  abso lu t e  mora l i t y  is a l s o  a r e a l i t y .  
Just  why he and t h e  o the r  t h r e e  were so convinced is  a matter f o r  
speculat ion.  One could easily f i n d  t h e  answer, if he were so i n c l i n e d ,  
i n  Kant's r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  h i s  mother. When Kant w a s  t h i r t e e n  t h a t  dea r  
lady died as a r e s u l t  of having administered t o  t h e  needs of a young 
woman in dangerous fever .  
f r i e n d  t o  swallow t h e  h o r r i b l e  medicine prescr ibed i n  those days,  and 
so ,  i n  an attempt t o  persuade h e r  p a t i e n t ,  she took t h e  medicine h e r s e l f .  
The r e s u l t  w a s  a nauseous a t t a c k ,  followed by t h e  delusion t h a t  she 
h e r s e l f  had t h e  f eve r ,  a delusion which l e d  t o  her  death i n  a few days. 
Kant's mother could no t  induce h e r  young 
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The pure unself ishness  of h i s  mother's behavior could no t  have helped 
but  impress t h e  young Kant, who w a s  a l r eady  deeply impressed by one 
who, h e  says ,  "planted and fos t e red  t h e  f i r s t  germ of good i n  me."  
Add t o  a l l  t h i s  t he  f a c t  t h a t  Kant remained a bachelor a l l  h i s  l i f e ,  
and t h a t  he s t rong ly  resembled h i s  mother i n  f a c i a l  f e a t u r e s  and h i s  
s i n g u l a r l y  contracted chest  (see Abbott 1889) and YOU have enough 
Freudian evidence t o  convict  Kant of f a l l i n g  v i c t im  t o  h i s  mother's 
morali ty.  
But I see no reason why Kant's b e l i e f  i n  abso lu t e  moral i ty  has t o  
be  explained while h i s  b e l i e f  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  method does n o t .  Both h i s  
b e l i e f s  are deep myster ies  of t he  human psyche, and are not t o  be ex- 
plained by biographical  data .  Those who r e s o r t  t o  biography t o  exp la in  
moral i ty  have t o  exp la in  why t h e  b e l i e f s  are so un ive r sa l ly  held.  They 
are, i n  f a c t ,  obliged t o  embark on an endless: voyage of causal  l i n k s ,  
f o r  one needs ask why Kant's mother w a s  so s e l f l e s s l y  bound by moral 
duty,  only,  say,  t o  discover  a dominating duty-bound f a t h e r  i n  her l i f e ,  
and so  on goes t h e  merry chase towards i n f i n i t y  o r  a f i r s t  cause. 
I n  t h i s  drama w e  t ake  i t  f o r  granted t h a t  moral i ty  i s  archetypal  
i n  Jung's sense,  i .e . ,  moral i ty  is some aspect  of t he  real  psyche. 
Kant w a s  motivated t o  introduce mora l i t y  i n t o  h i s  philosophy because of 
a fundamental convict ion t h a t  philosophy must account f o r  t h e  ex i s t ence  
of mora l i t y ,  and t h a t  t h e  real world which sc i ence  c r e a t e s  cannot include 
t h i s  r e a l i t y ,  which Kant calls t h e  Good W i l l .  
of t h e  Good W i l l  i s  n o t  de r ivab le  from t h e  world-view of science.  This 
convict ion,  1 t ake  i t ,  was a l e g i t i m a t e  one and is  not t o  be explained 
as a consequence of Kant 's  own biography. 
Thus 
Thus, for  Kant t h e  archetype 
S t i l l ,  t h e  psychic o r i g i n  
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of t h e  convict ion remains as our mystery: why do men be l i eve  i n  mora l i ty  
when the re  i s  no "evidence" f o r  i ts  exis tence ,  where evidence c o n s i s t s  
of t h e  f ind ings  of ob jec t ive  science? 
To explore  t h i s  mystery a b i t  f u r t h e r ,  w e  need t o  see what Kant 
had t o  say about mora l i ty ,  and t o  t h i s  end we can r e tu rn  t o  our  four  
quest ions.  
1. How are mora l i ty  and r ea l i t y  r e l a t e d ?  The answer i n  Rant i s  
that  the re  are two, causa l ly  icdependent worlds, t he  s c i e n t i s t ' s  world 
of phenomena, and the  i . n t e l l i g i b l e  world of t h e  Good Will. The la t te r  
e x i s t s  j u s t  as much as the  former. The s c i e n t i s t ' s  world is  crea ted  
out of experience,  and reveals t o  us t he  immensity of our universe .  
The world of tne Good N i l 1  i s  c rea ted  by what Kant cur ious ly  ca l l s  
' 'postulates ."  To us today a pos tu l a t e  o f t e n  means an assumption i n  a 
formal sc ience ,  e .g . ,  in geometry. I n  t h i s  sense, pos tu la tes  are "taken 
f o r  granted" i n  order  t o  play t h e  game; indeed, they bear  a ' c l o s e  re- 
semblance t o  the  r u l e s  of a game l i k e  chess.  R u t  Kant obviously intended 
a much s t ronge r  meaning, which i s  never made clear i n  the  tor tuous  
second Cr i t ique .  Ins tead  of following Kant's t ex t ,  I ' l l  suggest a 
meaning derived from t h e  etymology of t h e  word. Pos tu l a t e  comes from 
I 'postulare," t o  demand. 
are the re fo re  demands made on the  human psyche. But who o r  what i s  doing 
Kant ' s  pos tu l a t e s  about t he  world of mora l i ty  
the  demanding? Here i s  our mystery again: where does t h e  voice  of 
moral i ty  come from? 
around u n t i l  a t  least  t h e  las t  scene, i f  no t  beyond. 
Like any good mystery, w e ' l l  at tempt t o  keep i t  
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Kant and Jung 
If we r e t u r n ,  f o r  t h e  moment, t o  our  earlier speculat ion about 
t h e  immensity of t h e  physical  universe and t h e  immanence of mora l i t y ,  
we f i n d  a n i c e  pa ra l e l l i sm between Kant and Jung i n  t h i s  regard.  
w e l l  known statement runs as follows: 
ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the  o f t e n e r  and t h e  more 
s t e a d i l y  we r e f l e c t  on them: the  s t a r r y  heavens above and t h e  moral 
law within.  We don' t  have t o  search f o r  them and make f a n t a s i e s  about 
them as though they were v e i l e d  i n  darkness e . .; I see them d i r e c t l y  
before  m e  and connect them d i r e c t l y  with my consciousness of my own 
exis tence.  The former [ t h e  s t a r r y  heavens] begimfrom t h e  p l ace  I 
occupy i n  the  e x t e r n a l  world of sense,  and enlarges  my connection 
Kant's 
"Two th ings  f i l l  t he  mind w i t h  
t h e r e i n  t o  an unbounded ex ten t  t o  worlds upon worlds and systems of 
systems e . e The second begins from my i n v i s i b l e  s e l f ,  my person- 
a l i t y ,  and e x h i b i t s  m e  i n  a world which has  t r u e  i n f i n i t y  . s . . The 
former view of a count less  mult i tude of worlds a n n i h i l a t e s  my importance 
as an animal c r e a t u r e  e e e The second, on t h e  con t r a ry ,  i n f i n i t e l y  
e l e v a t e s  my worth as an i n t e l l i g e n c e  of my pe r sona l i ty  . . . . 
(Kant, 1788, p .  313) 
I t  
And Jung: "In my p i c t u r e  of the  world t h e r e  is  a vas t  ou te r  realm 
and an equal ly  v a s t  i nne r  realm; between these  two s tands man, f ac ing  
now one and now the  o t h e r ,  and, according t o  temperament and disposi-  
t i o n ,  taking t h e  one f o r  t h e  abso lu te  t r u t h  by denying o r  s a c r i f i c i n g  
t h e  other." (Jung, 1961, Par. 777) 
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Thus both Kant and Jung were f u l l y  convinced of t h e  r e a l i t y  of t h e  psyche, 
bu t ,  of course,  were f a  apart on t h e i r  idea  of what t h i s  r e a l i t y  i s .  
For Kant it is f a i r l y  s imple ,  "pure in t e l l i gence , "  i.e., a moral w i l l .  
The search  f o r  s i m p l i c i t y  was a hallmark of Kant 's  age. 
i 
For Jung it is 
v a s t l y  complex. 
Kant 
The discovery of complexity is a hallmark of our  age. 
-
2, What is t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between reason and mora l i ty?  This  
quest ion is  answered by Kant i n  what seems t o  be a very curious manner, 
u n t i l  one understands his whole system. 
not caused by anything else. 
W i l l  were good because i t  acted t o  se rve  one 's  own or another ' s  happiness,  
i t  would be caused by t h e  phenomenal events  t h a t  b r ing  on happiness.  
Kant's own way of pu t t ing  it  is as follows: "As my concern is with 
moral philosophy, my ques t ion  is t h i s :  
t o  cons t ruc t  a pure moral philosophy, p e r f e c t l y  devoid of t h e  empir ica l ,  
e.g., of behavioral  s c i ences  l i k e  anthropology? That such a philosophy 
must be poss ib l e  is  ev ident  from the  common i d e a  of duty and of t he  
moral l a w s .  
A Good W i l l  must be " f ree ,"  i a e e 9  
This is Kant's f i r s t  pos tu l a t e ,  I f  t h e  
whether i t  is  abso lu te ly  necessary 
Everyone must admit t h a t  i f  a l a w  is t o  have a moral f o r c e  
. e it must carry wi th  i t  absolu te  necess i ty ;  t h a t ,  f o r  example, t h e  
precept ,  'Thou s h a l t  not l i e , '  is not  v a l i d  f o r  men alone,  as i f  o t h e r  
r a t i o n a l  beings had no need t o  observe it . . e . Hence t h e  b a s i s  of 
moral ob l iga t ion  must not be sought i n  the  na tu re  of man, or i n  t he  
circumstances of t h e  world i n  which he  is placed, bu t  - a p r i o r i  and 
simply i n  t h e  conceptions of pure reaso . @ I  (Kant, 1785, p.  5) The end 
of t h i s  passage is  very important,  because in it Kant once and f o r  a l l  
severs  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be een mora l i ty  and p r u ~ e n ~ i a l ~ t y  (planning):  
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"Although any o t h e r  p 
experience may be i n  certa iversal, y e t  i n  as f a r  as i t  
rests even i n  t h e  least b i t  on empir ica l  bases ,  perhaps only as t o  motive, 
such a precept  can never be c a l l e d  a moral l a w ,  al though of course it 
le." (Kant, 1785, p. 6) 
nded on p r i n c i p l e s  of mere 
This  is a l l  very b e a u t i f u l  i n  its p u r i t y ,  and reason seems almost 
t o  have taken on a P l a  on ic  r e a l i t y .  But what is t h i s  pure reason 
which Kant alludes t o ?  The somewhat d i sappoin t ing  answer is t h a t  i t  is 
t he  func t ion  of arguing u n i v e r s ~ ~ l y  and consis tent ly--or ,  as Yung would 
put i t ,  it is in t rove r t ed  thinking.  
It is c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  t h a t  i n t rove r t ed  th inking  types tend a t  t i m e s  
t o  go overboard and t r y  t o  make log ic ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  consis tency,  do 
a l l  t h e i r  work f o r  them. A good example i s  Charles 
Babbage, t h e  f i r s t  inventor  
century. 
"ratio" have the  same or ig in .  
of a computing machine i n  the  n ine teenth  
Babbage must have been aware of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  "reason" and 
I n  a let ter to  Tennyson about h i s  
couple t  "The Vision of Sin,"  "Every minute d i e s  a man,/ Every minute 
one is born," Babbage (1961) wrote: "I need hard ly  po in t  ou t  t o  you 
t h a t  t h i s  c a k u l a t i o n  would tend t o  keep t h e  sum t o t a l  of t h e  world 's  
populat ion i n  a state of ~ e r p e t u a ~  equipoise ,  whereas it i a  a well- now^ 
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s a i d  sum cons tan t ly  on t h e  increase.  I would 
t h e r e f o r e  t ake  the  l i b e r t y  of ~ u g g ~ s t i n g  t h a t  i n  t h e  next e d i t i o n  of 
your exce l l en t  poem t h e  erroneous c a l c u l a t i o n  t o  which I r e f e r  should 
be cor rec ted  as follows: 
t een th  is born ,g  
'Every mom@ t d i e s  a man/ And one and a s ix -  
I may add t h a t  ,the exac t   figure^ [ r a t i o ]  are 1.167, 
hing must ,  of course,  be conceded t o  t h e  l a w s  of metre." 
(Babbage, 1961) 
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ofp of l o g i c a l  , i f  less absurd, s t i l l  
carries t h e  same f l a ~ o r ~  Above 1 must act  accord 
e x c e p t ~ o n a b l e  p i n c i p l e ,  i r e r 9  must be abso lu te ly  con 
The r e s u l t  is  t h e  unfor tuna te  c a t e g o r i c a l  imperative: act  so t h a t  thou 
can w i l l  t h e  p r i n c i p l  ( m ~ x i m ~  of thy a c t i o n  t o  become a un ive r sa l  l a w .  
Out of t h i s  p iece  of l o ~ i ~ - p l a y i n ~  
code. The argumen goes as PolPoGs: "A man decides  t h a t  he must borrow 
some money. H e  knows t 
t h a t  no one w i l l  lend h 
promises eo repay i n  a d e f i n i t e  t i m e  . e . . Suppose, now, he  r e so lves  
t o  borrow and promise t o  rep  
expressed thus: whemever L th ink  myself i n  want of money, I w i l l  
borrow and promise $0 repay, though I know 1'11 never be ab le  t o  do so. 
hoped t o  de r ive  a l l  t h e  moral 
he  w i l l  aoe be a b l e  t o  repay i t ,  but  he  sees 
a pemny unless  he  f o r c e f u l l y  and convincimgl 
; then t h e  maxim of h i s  a c t i o n  would be 
. * . Now what would t h i s  maxim be l i k e  i f  i t  were a un ive r sa l  law? 
We see at once that it could never hold as a universal l a w  of na tu re ,  
because i t  would con t r ad ic t  i t s e l f .  
un ive r sa l  l a w  t h a t  everyone when he th inks  himself i n  a d i f f i c u l t y  
For i f  we suppose i t  t o  be  a 
l e  t o  promise w ~ ~ t ~ v @ ~  he p leases ,  with the I n t e n t  of not  
h i s  promise, ise i t s e l f  would become impossible,  as 
w e l l  as t h e  end t h a t  one might have i n  view of i t ,  since no one would 
be l i eve  t h a t  anything was p r o ~ ~ ~ e ~  t o  him, bu t  would r i d i c u l e  a l l  
promises as v a i  8." (Kant, 1785, p. 49) 
Most people whose o r i e n t a t i o n  i s  towards f e e l i n g  would q u i t e  
n a t u r a l l y  suspect  t h i s  account of mora l i ty ,  and might be j u s t i f i e d  i n  
labeling it " l o g i c a l  doggerel". 
(1969 ) ver s ion  more p a l a t a b l e  : 
They might , indeed, f i n d  James T a t e '  s 
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The Book of Lies 
I 'd like to have a word 
with you. 
for a minute? 
until now. Do you believe 
Could we be alone 
I have been lying 
I believe myself? 
yourself when you believe me? 
is natural. Forgive me. Could we be alone 
forever? Forgive us all. The word 
Do you believe 
Lying 
is my enemy, 
bribes, betrayals, I am lying 
even now. Can you believe 
that? I give you my word. 
I have never been alone; 
But even introverted thinking types can easily find the defect 
in Kant's logic. Deception is a strategy in the game of life. Thus, 
according to game theory, one deceives another by playing a mixed 
strategy of honesty and lying. There is nothing inconsistent about 
universalizing the maxim of this mixed strategy: i.e., all persons 
can play their life's moves in an optimal (min-max) manner in which 
deception plays an integral part. (For details, see, for example, 
Luce and Raiffa, 1957.) Thus, not surprisingly, introverted thinking 
can destroy what introverted thinking creates. 
As another example, Kant believes that it is immoral to commit 
suicide, because "we see at once the self-contradictoriness of a system 
of nature in which there is a law which says that life should be de- 
stroyed by the very spirit-of-life whose special nature is to improve 
life." (Kant, 1785, p. 48) It only took the cleverness of a 
Schopenhauer to make a whole philosophy out of the "nature" which Kant 
took to be self-contradictory. 
But, though Kant fell victim to his thinking function in this 
regard, his thinking nonetheless led him to a beautiful and convincing 
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concept of mo eading of mora l i ty  as one can 
st expressed i n  h i s  F u ~ d ~ e n t ~ ~  n the  whole P i t e r a t u  
P r inc ip l e s :  
o r  t h a t  of another ,  i n  every case as an end w i t h a l ,  never as a means 
only." 
l i g h t :  N e  who 
coneemplates s u i c i d e  should ask  himself whether h i s  a c t i o n  can be con- 
s i s t e n t  with the  Idea  of h u ~ n i t y  as an end i n  i t s e l f .  I f  he des t roys  
d e r  t o  escape Prom pa in fu l  circumstances,  he uses a person 
"So act as t o  treat humani ty~  whether i n  your own person 
The fmmorality of s u i c i d e  and decept ion now appear i n  a c l e a r e r  
" F i r s t l y ,  under t h e  head of necessary duty t o  onese l f :  
merely as a means t o  maintain a t o l e rab  e condi t ion  up t o  t h e  end of 
l i fe .  But a man is o t  a t h ing ,  t h a t  is t o  say,  something which can 
be used merely as means, bu t  must i n  a l l  h i s  a c t i o n s  be  always considered 
as an  end i n  hfmself,  
man i n  my own person so as to m u t i l a t e  him, t o  damage o r  k i l l  him e . 
I ccnnot,  t he re fo re ,  dispose i n  any way of a 
"Secondly, as regards  necessary d u t i e s 9  o r  those of strict obl iga-  
tion, towards o the r s ;  h e  who is  thinking of making a ly ing  promise t o  
o t h e r s  w i l l  see a t  once t h a t  he  would be using another  man merely as a 
means wfthout t he  la t ter  c o n t a f n ~ ~ g  a t t h e  same time t he  end i n  himself .  
For he  whom I propose by such a promise t o  use f o r  my own purposes cannot 
poss ib ly  a s s e n t  t o  my mode of a c t i n g  t o w ~ r d s  him, and t h e r e f o r e  cannot 
himself conta in  t h e  end of t h i  ac t ion .  This v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of h ~ m a n ~ t y  i n  o the r  men is more obvious i f  w e  take  i n  examples of 
a t t a c k s  on t h e  freedom d property of others .  For then i t  is clear 
he  who t ~ ~ n s g K e ~ ~ ~ ~  t h e  rPgh ntends t o  u s e  the  
~ i t h o ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d e r ~ ~ g  t h a t  as r a t i o n a  of o the r s  merely as mean 
always t o  be esteemed also as ends, t h a t  is ,  as befngs who 
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must be capable of co of the  very same 
action'* (Kant 1985 
n f f i e a n t  p i ece  of mora l i ty  is enough f o r  our  purposes,  
even though we may not  be  a b l e  
can say  many th ings  thae  it could mean, each very r i c h  i n  i t s  peychological 
impl ica t ions ,  
y exac t ly  what i t  means. But 
I n  i t s  most: d i r e c e  i t  says  t o  me t h a t  whenever someone uses  
someone else i n  e 
ob jec t ,  he  is befng ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ .  Consider, for example, chat  American 
past-t ime c a l l e d  "urban r elopment I *  S l  8 are ugly, d i r t y  places, 
So t he  planners  have gone the bus iness  of cleaning them up, To 
t h i s  end i n  t h e  p a s t  they knocked down t h e  w a l l s  and hauled away t h e  
boards and s tones .  
asked the boards and s tones  how they f e l t  about i t  a l l ,  how they want 
t o  e x i s t ;  n e i t h e r  d i d  they ask t he  nhabi tan ts .  The slum dwel le rs  are 
t r ea t ed  i n  e x s c t l y  the same manner as t h e  inanimate ob jec t s ,  as means, 
no t  as ends. 
same way t h a t  he  would use  an inanimate 
They also hauled away the  inhab i t an t s .  They never 
But t h e  dram of this  sort of ~ l a n n i n ~  arrogance is much more 
han appears  a t  f ir  k, s i g h t .  Nowadays, planners  are more 
s o ~ h ~ s t i c a t @ ~ ~  and do try  t o  a e t e ~ i n e  how people i n  t h e  slums f e e l ,  
by a change, Suppose, 
for e % a m ~ ~ e ,  t h e  slums are being e l ea red  i n  order  t o  bu i ld  a h o s p i t a l ,  
which is despera te ly  need he  cfty. Then, says  t h e  planner ,  
slum dwellers  
her  people, The tota b e n e f i t  w i l l  be  ~ a x i ~ i z e d  i f  w e  b u i l d  
t h e  h o s p i t a l .  ~ u r ~ h e ~ m o ~ ~ ,  if we are wi 
t h a t  t he  Pnhab t a n t s  are hou even b e t t e r  dwel i ngs  than they 
rs, w e  w i l l  see t o  i e  
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e placed in more u a r t e r s ,  SO where %s t h e  im- 
moral i ty? 1st is  the re ,  pa ter  OW b e n e v o l @ ~ t  
Because when we looked a t  
s a i d  t o  them: "There' 
remain here. W p p r o p ~ ~ a t e  quar 
o the r  words, w e  ere QUB Slum d W e l ~ ~ ~ S  i n  ~ a C ~ l y  he same way fa which 
f i l t h y  boards and s tones ,  w e  
f o r  you t o  go, r a t h e r  than  t o  
e treat i~animate obj cts,  as ~ e a ~ s ,  not ends. 
The apparent c o n f l i c t  between Kan i a n  mora l i ty  and s o c i a l  ~ @ c e s s ~ ~ y  
is nowhere so c le  r f y  e x p r e s s e ~  as in t h e  ai l  t a ry .  
issue of - L i f e  magazhe ,  t h e  following ~ e ~ c ~ i p ~ i o ~  of the  philosophy of 
t he  m i l i t a r y  career man is given: 
General L e w i s  W e  Walt, hero of t h r e e  wars and Assiseant  Commandan 
the  U. S. Marine Corps, hangs a bronze plaque. E n t i t l e d  'The Leader's 
Code,' it sees f o r t h  the p r i  e i p l e s  by which General Walt and a v a s t  
major i ty  of o the r  U, S, m i l i t a r y  men try t o  l i v e .  
In a sp r ing  1969 
"In t he  Washington Off ice  of Lt. 
"'1 become a l e a d e r , '  i t  begins ,  'by what I do. I know my s t r e n g t h  
and my w e a ~ n e s ~ ~  a I strive cons tan t ly  for self-improvement . e e a 
I know my job and I c a r r y  out  t he  spirit:  as well as t h e  le t ter  of 
orders  11 r e c e i v e e '  
"Perhaps i t s  key sen  B are these:  'I @ ~ t i m ~ ~ e  t h e  s i t  
t h e  b e s t  course of actio 
I fol low through t o  i n s u r e  
r h a t  t h e i r  d u t i e s  ar f u l l y  d ischarg  
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This description is followed by a soldier's reactions: 
'"So many of our people were dead at the end of each week,' recalls 
Ken Willis. 'You begin to feel you've been in Vietnam all your life. 
You're a machine, only capable of reacting to booby traps. You feel 
you're hanging on a string and somebody may cut that string. Rnotion- 
ally and psychologically you're running away from the situation, but 
physically you're stuck there.'" 
Of course, the whole problem of the draft in America is well known 
to have moral overtones: many citizens believe that the draft laws are 
immoral, because they- "use" young men who have no say in the matter to 
serve as means only for society's "good", as seen by some of the elders. 
Much the same conflicts have occurred between those who wish to 
maintain "law and order" and those who have other aims in life. 
Recently, I was teargassed during class at the University of California 
at Berkeley, because the National Guard wished to disperse the dissident 
students; I was describing Kant's moral thesis as the gas poured into 
the classroom. No more dramatic illustration could have been devised. 
Another way to state Kant's thesis is to point out that morality 
knows no trade-offs--no calculus of benefits here minus costs there. 
One does not make up for evil by doing more good; once the immoral act 
is done, it is there, and remains there forever. 
There are actually a number of versions of Kant's theory. Thus a 
"mild version'' would say that so long as a person agrees to being treated 
as a means only, then no immorality occurs. In the quotation above, 
Kant himself seems to imply that "assent" on the part of another may 
remove the immorality. A strong version, which I'll adopt here, says 
that the immorality is independent of a person's wishes; or, put 
otherwise, it is immoral to act or assent to another's acting so that 
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you are treated as a means only. 
The challenge of the strong version of Kant's theory of morality 
is pervasive and inescapable. 'For example, I'm probably being immoral 
in the manner in which I've written this essay, for I've "used" four 
people as a means to an end, by translating their works to serve my own 
purposes. I could try to defend this act on prudential grounds, by 
arguing that the risk of misrepresentation of their ideas is well com- 
pensated by the richness of material and strength of idea one gains by 
the dramatic method. But the issue is whether one can resolve apparent 
immorality in this manner. Is the strong version of Kant's moral theory 
tenable, or can we show that all that is contained therein is adequately 
captured by a thoroughgoing prudential philosophy? 
Thus we owe it to ourselves to see whether we can hear the voice 
of individual morality through the loud-speaker of social morality 
(prudentiality). This 
is the third question, which now takes the form: can we evolve aplan 
of serving the needs and wants of mankind which will at the same time 
provide us with a sound morality? If mankind is thoroughly prudent 
We need to see what social morality really is. 
in seeking his own happiness, brill not morality emerge as a by-product? 
For Kant, the answer was, "only in the limit". At any stage, seeking 
happiness, either social or individual, is at variance with the moral 
law. 
pletely moral. 
Kant and Jung 
One cannot simultaneously be a benevolent planner and be com- 
We need to understand this point more thoroughly. But before we 
start this philosophical investigation, we should look at our fourth 
question: how are morality and psychology related? We see that Kant 
postulated the purest of archetypes, the Good Will, as the dominating 
35 
force in his morality. The archetype is so pure, in fact, that it is 
timeless. 
we have seen, and it helps individuate the objects of the phenomenal 
world. 
tradiction between freedom and the determinism of nature in one and the 
same action, we must recall what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
or what follows therefrom, namely, that the necessity of nature,which 
cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject, pertains only to the 
properties of the thing which is subject to time-conditions, 
words, the necessity of nature applies only $0 the subject as a phenom- 
enon. * e . But the very same subject, who on the other side is con- 
scious of himself as a thing-in-himself, also considers his existence 
insofar as it- is not subject to time conditions, and thinks of himself 
as being determined by laws which he gives himself through reason. 
In this aspect of his existence, nothing comes temporally before the 
defemination of his will. e e .I1 (Kant, 1788, p. 229) .  
"Time," for Kant, is the archetype of his first Critique, as 
As Kant puts it: "Now, in order to resolve the apparent con- 
In other 
Hence, in the noumenal world of the second Critique, time and its 
correlate, causality, do not exist. Furthermore, the Good Will even 
transcends anthropology as a behavioral science, as we have seen, and 
becomes the archetype of the pure moral law. 
However, Kant leaves us with a deep puzzle vis-&-vis --- the psycho- 
logical individual. In the first Critique, he argued that things may 
be individuated in one of two ways--by a space-time framework, or by 
minute description. Both methods have been used by science fromits 
very beginnings. The planets are individuated by their orbits in the 
heavens, i.e., by space and time. 
fingerprints, i.e., by minute description. 
Men are often individuated by their 
36 
But now we come to the world of the Good Will. What individuates 
one Will from another? Not space and time, as we have seen, Nor 
minute description either, because all the categories of rich experience 
have nothing to do with the Good Will. 
have been aware of this problem, and somehow thought of a Good Will 8s 
being related to a specific" space-time individuated human 
satisfactory story is forthcoming. 
inventing a new theory of psychological individuation as he went along. 
The individual is the self, but the self in a unique form. The point 
is a very subtle one, but suppose we try it this way. That two leaves 
in the forest cannot be exactly alike is almost certainly true. But 
as Kant pointed out, in princiDSthey could be: 
or physical reason for the impossibility of two leaves being the same. 
Furthermore, even though two leaves are not  exactly alike, they may be 
very much more alike than they are like other things; there are degrees 
of likeness, so to speak. But in the case of the unique individual, we 
must say that in principle he is not exactly like anyone else, a& there 
are no degrees of likeness: 
that individual. We see the similarity in this last point between 
uniqueness and morality. 
no trade-offs of good for evil; in uniqueness there are no degrees 
either, no comparisons. Grammatically, we can't say, "You're pretty 
unique," but most important, psychologically we can't either. 
What then? Although Kant may 
no really 
But Jung can help, because he was 
there is no logical 
he isn't more like this individual than 
In morality there are no degrees of goodness, 
But remember all along we are trying to speak to the scientific 
mind, which will want to know what this uniqueness really is. 
answer is not readily at hand, because we lack a logic of uniqueness. 
And the 
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 everth he less^ there r of ~ @ r ~  helpfu as well as radieal 
ideas which Jung presents. F%rst, individuatiQn is a process for 
Jung, and in this regard he dlffers from Kant and all the 
rest of science. At a given momen of time, a body is indivi~uated 
for Kant and for all physics, even including modern quantum mechanics, 
where statistical  distribution^ sf the position of a particle do net  fn 
the least negate the static nature of its individ~a~i~n~ 
does Jung mean by a process of individ~ati~n? 
But what 
Does he mean we move 
rd uniqueness? But, then, aren't here degrees of ~ni~ueness after 
all? 
Kant and Jung 
Thus, as so often happens with one's reactions to Jung, we have 
The insight is the idea that both an insight and a deep puzzlement. 
psychological individuation is a process, and not a completion. 
Another way to put the matter is to say that individuation by space 
and time is essentially dependent on the object's relationship to 
other objects, just as is individuation by minute description. But 
the kind of individua~lon Jung seems to have in mind smms not to have 
this essential, property; although relationships are very important, 
to other psyches, the individuation PtseSf 
out of such ~ela~ion~hips~ 
Further to deepen the insig~~ and confound the per 
Yung's ~l@vation of the proeese of individuation to the pinnacle of the 
good, so that the process is alik 
pure idea, and Kant's Good Wi ab ~ ~ t g ~ a t e d  by the moral 
are the cs~~ariso 
Jung and P l a t 0  
I n  the P la ton ic  myths, not  a l l  sou l s  reach t h e  blessed state;  
indeed, it seems apparent  tha t  t h e  g rea t  mass of them do not .  And 
here  i s  Jung on t h e  same top ic :  
on t h e  assumption t h a t  a man i s  capable of a t t a i n i n g  wholeness, i n  
"These proceedings [of  therapy]  rest 
o ther  words, that  he has it i n  h i m  t o  be hea l thy .  I mention t h i s  
assumption because there are without doubt ind iv idua ls  who are not  
at bottom a l toge the r  v i ab le  and who rap id ly  pe r i sh  i f ,  f o r  any reason, 
they come face  t o  f ace  with the i r  wholeness. 
happen, they merely lead a miserable ex is tence  f o r  t h e  rest of  t h e i r  
days as fragments o r  p a r t i a l  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  shored up by s o c i a l  o r  
psychic paras i t i sm.  
o the r s ,  more o f t en  than  not  in i re te ra te  humbugs who cover up t h e i r  
deadly emptiness under a f i n e  outward show. 
undertaking t o  t r y  t o  treat them wi th  the method here discussed. 
The only t h i n g  t h a t  "helps" here is  t o  keep up t h e  show, f o r  t h e  
t r u t h  would be unendurable o r  use less . "  
Jung and Kant 
Even i f  t h i s  does not  
Such people are, very much t o  t h e  misfortune of 
It would be a hopeless 
(Jung, 1953, p. 109) 
The moral p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  emerges i n  Jung i s  "thou s h a l t  
If w e  apply Kant's p r i n c i p l e  undergo t h e  process of individuat ion".  
of" t r e a t i n g  every man as "an end withal" ,  what  seems t o  emerge is  "thou 
s h a l t  never i n t e r f e r e  with t he  process  of ind iv idua t ion  of  t h y s e l f  o r  
another". 
he comes c lose  t o  it: 
t h a t  a man should be individuated.  Not only i s  it d e s i r a b l e ,  it i s  
absolu te ly  indispensable  because, through h i s  contamination w i t h  o t h e r s ,  
Jung seems never t o  state t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h i s  form, but 
"Here one may ask ,  perhaps,  why it i s  so d e s i r a b l e  
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he f a l l s  i n t o  s i t l aa t io  
y with himself.  Fr neonacious contamina 
f f e r e n t i a ~ i o n  t h e r e  is begot ten a compulsion t o  be and to act in 
a way contrary t o  one 's  own nature .  Accordingly a man can n e i t h e r  be 
i t h  himself no r  accept r ~ s ~ o n s i b i l i ~ y  f o r  himself. He f e e l s  
hamself t o  be i n  a de  ee une th ica l  condi t  
ny with h b s e  f is p rec i se ly  t h e  e u r o t i c  and i n t o l e r a b l e  
n from which he  seeks t o  be d ~ l i v e r e d ~  and d e l ~ v e r a n ~ e  f r  
ion  will come only when he  can be  and act  as he f e e l s  is 
conformable with h i s  t r u e  s e l f .  
dim and uncer ta in  a t  f 
progressive development. 
'As I am, so I a c t , '  he  can be at  one with himself ,  even though i t  be 
Peopl@ have a f e e l i n g  for these  th ings ,  
but  growing ever  s t ronger  and clearer wi th  
When 8 man can say of h i s  states and a c t i o n s ,  
d i f f i c u l t ,  and he can accept: r e e p o n s i b i l i t y  for himself even though 
he s t r u g g l e  aga ins t  it. 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  bear  wi th  than onese l f .  
and found yourse l f , '  says Nietzsche.) Y e t  even t h i s  most d i f f i c  
of achievements becomes o s s f b l e  i f  w e  can d i s t ingu i sh  ourselves  from 
t h e  unconscious contents .  Th %ntrover t  discovert;  these  co 
himself ,  t h e  extrav@ ro jee t ed  upan human objects. I 
We must recognize t h a t  nothing is  more 
('You sought t h e  heavies t  burden, 
are t h e  cause of bl inding  
es and our r e l a t i o n s  t o  our fellowmen, 
both unrea l .  For t hese  reasoms i i v i d u ~ t ~ o n  is  i n d i ~ ~ e n ~ ~ b ~ e  f o r  
people, not only as a ~ ~ e K a p e u t ~ ~  ~ e e s ~ % ~ y ~  but. as a high 
idea  of the b e s t  e can do. Mor should I omit t o  r 
e c h ~ i 8 t ~ ~ R  i d e a l  of 
you.' The $de t h e  bottom of t h i s  i d e a l  
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is that right action comes from right thinking, and that there is no 
cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the 
individual himself. To put the matter drastically: the man who is 
pauper or parasite will never solve the social question." (Jung, 1953, 
p. 223). 
We see from this passage that if we define individual morality as 
the obligation to undergo the process of individuation, and social 
morality (planning) as the obligation to satisfy people's needs and 
wants, then Jung makes individual morality a necessary condition that 
must be satisfied before social morality can exist. Here we have one 
answer to the relationship between morality and (social) prudentiality. 
But a certain amount'of uneasiness with this answer must occur. 
The uneasiness arises out of the need, for Jung, to create an 
environment for the process of individuation, e.g., the sessions where 
the analyst and his "patient" interact. Of course, any specific 
environment is not required, and Jung does state that many people 
have gone through the process of individuation without any clearly 
recognizable professional help. Rut there can be no question that 
many others desperately require such aids, or else they run into a deep 
danger of following pathways that run out in a dry and rocky wilderness 
from whence there is no return. Thus it apparently follows that there 
are some, and perhaps a very large number of souls who can become 
blessed only if the social environment provided them aid. In this regard, 
Kant seems to be on safer ground, for there is no indication in Kant 
that a particular social organization would significantly aid men in 
being motivated by the Good Will. But even for Kant the matter is not 
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t a l l  clear. It is r ep  c ~ i t ~ c i ~ e a  on 
how, obeying the moral 
1" does seem a bit casfer for t h e  afP than 
! 
e t h e r  t he  oppos i te  OS 
esupposes t h e  so 
of s o c i a l  moraliey. That is, e is 50me socid i n s t i -  
t u t i o n  which would h 
i n  h i s  K i n g ~ o ~  f End Kingdom of Heaven. Othe 
expressed, t he  ~ ~ ~ s t i  extend s o c i a l  ra l i ty - - i . e .  
s o c i a l  ~ ~ ~ d ~ n t i a ~ i t y ~  it w i l l  provide us wi th  a l l  w 
need for a code of e can, them perhaps t h e  
need f o r  ~ n ~ ~ ~ e ~ @ ~ ~  
nt wanted.to have happen 
ill also disappear. 
Singes 
Our spokesman now is E ar A. Singer .  W e  no te  f i r s t  of a l l  t h a t  
S inge r ' s  progr 
s o c i a l  ~ o r a ~ ~ t y )  needs to  ~ ~ i n t ~ o d ~ c ~  purpose. For Kant (but not  
a l l  m o ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~  wi th in  what I am c a l l i n g  
s i a r i l y  for Jung), the  ~ o ~ a l  law is not v a l i d  because i t  se rves  
some purpose; i t  i d-of i t s e l f .  I n  o the r  words, Kmnt's 
w h ~ ~ @  Singe r ' s  is t e l e o l o g i c a l .  Singe 
nt r a t h e r  than a forced 
f two t h ~ ~ ~ ~ :  it 
ght o f  t he  pas t  has accepted, 
. One will, bn f a c t ,  
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f i n d  the  la t ter  t o  have been t h e  case ;  and moreover f i n d  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
ways of de f in ing  t o  have been c a l l e d  from an e a r l y  day the ' t e l e o l o g i c a l '  
and t h e  ' a t e l e o l o g i c a l '  r e spec t ive ly .  For reasons t h a t  w i l l  appear as 
I 
we advance, we  may l e t  t h e  h i s t o r i a n  provide us first w i t h  examples of 
' a t e l e o l o g i c a l  goods'. 
"These a t e l e o l o g i c a l  goods are t h e  e a s i e s t  o f  a31 t o  f i n d ,  f o r  they  
c o s t  no thought t o  formulate  and s t i l l  less t o  fol low; toge the r  they  make 
up t h e  world 's  t r e a s u r e  of maxims. ' L e t  j u s t i c e  be done t h o u g h t h e  
heavens fa l l , '  the  Roman saying had it, and no wording could have been 
better conceived t o  b r ing  out  the v i r t u e  t o  which a l l  m a x i m s  pretend-- 
t h a t  of  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  p r a c t i c e s  u n i v e r s a l l y  good; not good as means t o  
one end and not t o  another ,  nor y e t  ends f o r  which now one means and 
now another  is good, bu t  p r a c t i c e s  c e r t a i n  t o  be good 'whatever happens'. 
Pr imi t ive  taboos,  sacred  customs, decalogues,  unwri t ten l a w s  o f  heaven, 
c a t e g o r i c a l  imperat ives  a r e  a l l  of t h i s  cha rac t e r ;  they  a l l  purpor t  t o  
be un ive r sa l  and necessary r u l e s  of conduct i s sued  i n  t h e  name of  v i r t u e  
o r  of p i e t y  o r  of both.  
them never differs g r e a t l y  from t h a t  acknowledged by Antigone i n  her hour 
of trial: a l l  t h a t  man may devise  'must y i e l d  unto t h e  changeless,  un- 
w r i t t e n  word of God; f o r  t h i s  i s  not  of today o r  yes te rday ,  bu t  l i v e s  
forever ;  and no man knows when first it came t o  be ' .  A s  f o r  the theory  
of contentment t h a t  goes wi th  t h i s  conception of purposeless  goodness,, 
Antigone again best suggests  t h e  essence of it: 
w r i t t e n  word i s  t o  s u f f e r  an inne r  d i scon ten t  so incurable  t h a t  a l i f e  
l i v e d  i n  t h e  torment of  it would not  be worth the l iv ing ."  
1936, p. 125) 
The a u t h o r i t y  accorded them by t h e  mind accept ing  
n o t t o  l i v e  by t h e  un- 
(S inger ,  
But f o r  S inger ,  t he  ques t ion  of whether w e  should pursue an a te l eo -  
l o g i c a l  e t h i c s  is q u i t e  simply answered i n  today ' s  world, because atel- 
eo log ica l  goods have no p lace :  
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But Singer does not end up i n  relativism at  a l l ,  but  i n s t e a d i n  a 
very modern form of absolutism. 
d i r e c t l y  from Kant, namely, t h e  not ion of an " idea l" .  
t e l l s  u s ,  is  a goal  t h a t  i n  p r i n c i p l e  can be a t t a i n e d ,  e.g., t h e  goa l  
of e a t i n g  a meal, or reading a book, o r  de fea t ing  an  enemy. But an 
ideal i n  p r i n c i p l e  i s  una t t a inab le ,  but  i n  p r i n c i p l e  can be approximated 
within any prescr ibed  l i m i t .  
H e  does so by borrowing an idea 
An "end", he 
The concept of " idea ls"  i s  no empty ab- 
s t r a c t i o n ,  f o r  Singer has an example of h i s  not ion of ideals inmodern 
science., Consider, f o r  example, t h e  v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  i n  a vacuum. 
I n  1875 it w a s  ca l cu la t ed  with a s tandard e r r o r  of p lus  o r  minus 300 
ki lometers  per  second; i n  t h e  2-950's, it w a s  ca l cu la t ed  with a strindard 
e r r o r  of p lus  o r  minus 0.5 ki lometers  per  second. S inge r ' s  po in t  i s  
t h a t  t h i s  phys ica l  constant  has an exact  value which does " e x i s t " ,  
but no man w i l l  ever know what it is .  According to Sigger ,  t h e  answer 
t o  any quest ion anyone can meaningfully pose i s  always an ideal;  t h e  
statements w e  make i n  response t o  quest ions about t he  n a t u r a l  world are 
always approximations. S inge r ' s  philosophy i s  an i d e a l i s t i c  realism: 
t h e  real i s  always an ideal. 
Singer used t h e  whole community of ideal searching s c i e n t i s t s  
as a model f o r  h i s  theory of  t h e  good. But he i s  much too  c lose  t o  
modern c u l t u r e  t o  equate t h e  good wi th  t h e  t r u e ,  i . e . ,  t o  say t h a t  our 
moral ob l iga t ion  as humans i s  s o l e l y  t o  approximate t h e  answers t o  
quest ions more and more c lose ly .  There must be a more fundamental ideal 
which explains  why truth-approximation i s  a good. If we can f i n d  such 
an i d e a l ,  then  we have an absolu te  good, not a r e l a t i v e  one. But it i s  
an absolu te  good t h a t  we can only know imperfec t ly ,  even though it 
e x i s t s  absolu te ly .  
pPe, it is e 
that a ~ w ~ y 5  expres 
tea, would the 
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up t o  on@ inc~ement by e n h ~ n c e d ?  Of one who has 
been grantea a wfsh t o  become a more p er€ul ehgss player there-  
a f t e r  h i s  wish t o  become a mo e p o w e r ~ u l  flute player, 
one say  i n  t h e  end; has  he beem ine eased i n  powers or mul t ip l i ed  fn 
i t h  no more than t h i s  to  guide us t h e  lat ter 0 doubt is aPP 
ming; but i f  we were a5ked, Ha8 
of t h e  two we had p yed for  but  Zoo which of t h e  t 
Could W e  hesitat@? ot  i f  t h e r e  f a  any so ness t o  t h e  *ancient wisdom 
p v  learned from a t h o u ~ a m ~  f a i r y  godms 
no godchild untceste on this very  point .  Their lesson is always t h e  
same: 'With only one wish t o  be had, choose r a t h e r  t he  power t o  g e t  
whatever you may corne 
th ing  i n  the world.' 
t o  have touched t h e  bottom of th ings ;  he take8 t h e  deepest  wish in 
any man, the  comon wish of a l l  men, t o  be no o t h e r  than t h e  
snore power--the wish t o  grow more powerful." (Singer ,  1936, p. 145). 
The word ''powe If in t h f s  passage is rather ~ Q g o ~ t ~ m a ~ @ ~  bec 
o want than t h e  p leasure  of having any d e  
Our moder at any rate t akes  t h i s  anc ien t  w ~ 8 d o ~  
t h e  r n e ~ ~ i n g  of t h e  been changing radically i n  t h e  last f e w  
years, To a ~ ~ e t e @ ~ ~ h  ~ ~ ~ u r y  mind (and a part of Singe 
century) ,  t h e r e  could be 
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e x p l o i t a t i o n  of na ture  t o  t h e  n ine teenth  century mind. 
today' s youth 
t a t i o n s  and are i n  a sense a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  t h e  emerging mora l i ty  of 
t h e  ind iv idua l .  
of h i s  language as w e l l  as h i s  i n t rove r t ed  th inking .  
la t ter  i s  concerned, w e  can see t h e  t r i c k  it has played on us. I f  
we are t e l e o l o g i c a l  c r e a t u r e s ,  as Jung and Singer  both be l ieved ,  then  
w e  seek goa ls ;  i f  we seek goa l s ,  t hen  a l l  of u s  must a l s o  want t h e  
power t o  a t t a i n  them, and t h i s  t h e r e f o r e  i s  our common ideal. 
t e l l s  us  so. It t e l l s  u s  t h a t  i f  anyone wants X ,  he a l s o  wants t h e  
power t o  a t ta in  X. 
However, f o r  
"power" and "control"  both have s t rong  negat ive  conno- 
Thus t o  apprec ia ie  Singer  w e  w i l l  have t o  be t o l e r a n t  
As far as t h e  
Thinking 
Now one ques t ion  which it i s  always appropr ia te  t o  ask  an in t ro -  
ver ted  t h i n k e r  when he is  being very i n t r o v e r t e d  and thought fu l  i s  
whether h i s  pronouncements are t au to log ie s ;  he above a l l  w i l l  recognize 
t h e  f a i r n e s s  of t h i s  ques t ion ,  because he  i s  i n t e n s e l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t au to log ie s .  Leibniz ,  f o r  example, be l ieved  t h a t  God th inks  only i n  
t a u t o l o g i e s ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  t a u t o l o g i c a l  t h ink ing  i s  p e r f e c t  knowledge. 
So we  ask Singer  whether t h e  sentence " i f  A wants X, A a l s o  wants t h e  
power t o  a t t a i n  X" i s  a tautology,  and I suspect  t h a t  h i s  answer must 
be "yes". 
person "wants X" is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he  seeks t h e  power t o  a t t a i n  X ,  so 
t h a t  "wanting X" opera t iona l ly  means "seeking t h e  power t o  a t t a i n  X" . 
But I remember i n  one of h i s  seminars on Hegel, a col league asked 
Singer whether one of Hegel's statements w a s  a tautology.  Singer  
looked a t  it f o r  awhile and s a i d ,  "Yes, but  i t ' s  a very good one." 
He wasn't  being a l toge the r  f a c e t i o u s ,  e i t h e r .  You s e e ,  i t ' s  always 
poss ib l e  t o  make fun of t h e  supe r io r  func t ion  of any psychological  
type whenever t h e  func t ion  r evea l s  i t s e l f  i n  a more o r  less pure form. 
Indeed, t h e  evidence w e  use  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a 
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But t h e  c r i t i c a l  po in t  i s  not  t h e  d i r e c t  behavior i t se l f ,  but  what 
i s  c rea t ed  by it. So Kant 's  "discovery" of t h e  c a t e g o r i c a l  imperat ive 
by pure thought i s  somewhat absurd. But something very b e a u t i f u l  and 
powerful came out  of it, namely, h i s  Kingdom of Ends. So, t o o ,  
S inger ' s  b i t  of "deducing" t h e  moral l a w ,  "thou shalt seek power" i s  
also somewhat absurd, bu t  what comes out  of it i s  one of t h e  deepest 
and most s i g n i f i c a n t  accounts of s o c i a l  mora l i ty  tha t  has  ever  been 
w r i t t e n .  
S inge r ' s  s t o r y  of soci.al mora l i ty  i s  divided i n t o  two p a r t s ,  which 
can be l abe led  p o s i t i v e  and negat ive ,  provided, l i k e  good Jungians o r  
IIegelians, we  recognize t h e  p o s i t i v e  s ide  of t h e  negat ive as w e l l  as 
the  negat ive side of  t h e  pos i t i ve .  
The p o s i t i v e  s i d e  draws heavi ly  on t h e  n ine teenth  century o p t i m i s t s ,  
Bentham, Mill, e t c . ,  bu t  v a s t l y  enr iches  t h e i r  concepts of s o c i a l  
u t i l i t y .  The genera l  i dea ,  which emerges from h i s  b a s i c  tau to logy ,  i s  
t o  develop an "enabling" va lue  theory ,  i .e . ,  t o  ca tegor ize  those  
a c t i v i t i e s  which inc rease  an ind iv idua l ' s  chances of gaining what he 
wants. These are r a t h e r  easy to enumerate: (1) a r i chness  of means 
at h i s  d i sposa l ,  i .e . ,  "plenty". ( 2 )  an awareness of t h e  appropr ia te  
means t o  s e l e c t ,  i . e .  "knowledge", and (3)  a d e s i r e  f o r  goals  t h a t  
a r e  cons i s t en t  wi th  t h e  goals  of o t h e r s  i .e., "cooperation". T h i s  
t r i l o g y  of i d e a l s  n e a t l y  summarizes a l l  t h a t  i s  contained i n  Singer 's  
concept of power. 
such a combination of i d e a l s  would f i n d  himself r i c h  i n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  
s k i l l f u l  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  t h e  r i g h t  one, and not  only f r e e  o f i n t e r -  
fe rence  by o t h e r s ,  b u t  enjoying t h e i r  he lp  and h i s  own he lpfu lness .  
A member of a community which progressed towards 
But t h e  simple l i s t i n g  of  t h e s e  ideals i s  not enough, because t h e  
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important point is the dynamics of their pursuit, which is most 
complicated. One clear story that history tells us, and especially 
recent history, is that societies which become reasonably successful 
in creating plenty at the same time become dangerously non-cooperative. 
Indeed, a social philosopher like Jacques Ellul (1964) has taken 
affluence to be a degrading form of human life, and has recommended 
the destruction of technology so that we can escape its determinism. 
The implication of his theory is that as a race we cannot successfully 
pursue all three ideals. But his evidence is weak, because there has 
been so little inquiry into the dynamics of ideal pursuit. It seems 
likely that a strong technological society tends to produce indiffer- 
ence to others, and especially those who are deprived. But if we 
could better understand what brings about a cooperative society , e . g .  , 
a scientific community or an artist colony, then we might better under- 
stand how plenty and cooperation can coexist. 
I have been perhaps overly brief in describing the first part of 
Singer's idealism, to which he devoted most of his life, in order to 
have more room for the second part, which is more germane to our 
drama. The question that any reasonable man will raise who is aware of 
his own self-interest is this: why should I pursue these ideals to 
any extent beyond what serves me best? Or, why not seek to find just 
that modicum of plenty, knowledge and cooperation which will make a 
comfortable life, free of anxiety and *ant? 
ideal of life is not to seek comfort, but contentment. The spirit of 
this reply is to be found in a number of sources, e,g., in Thomas 2 
Kempis, "My son, I ought to be thy supreme and ultimate end if thou 
would be truly blessed". 
The answer is, because the 
Or, in Chateaubriand's description of a static 
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heaven as "drear% h e  %deal eeeke 
0,' '  who is t h e  bless p e r ~ e v e r e  fn a pro 
eat, then to  win con l i f e  fs a necessa~y c o n ~ i t i o n  t o  con 
one needs all the quali %e8 of the hero." 
Singer and Jung 
(Singer ,  1964 9 p e  3 4 )  
Here again t h e ~ e  ill be some eo %nology, beeaus 
chetype of t he  hers i n  Jung is o ly one among many, an 
hero ic  is of i p t i o n  of one s t a g e  of devel  
r a t h e r  than a de  ion of all deve l  pment, as jam Singer. But Jung 
does on occasfon r e f e r  t o  "Not for 
nothing is t he  i n d i ~ i ~ u  
of t h e  hero9 . .'I (.Ye Jacob 3.965, p. 4 7 ) .  
e whole process in t h i s  manner: 
Q P O ~ ~ S S  said t o  be an analogy of t h e  'quest 
One senses a paral laPism of ~ ~ ~ c o ~ e ~ ~  of Jung and Singer ,  each 
i ~ d e ~ e n d e n t ~ y  searchfng out  the earn mystery. The q u a l i t y  of mind 
t h a t  makes a per  
q u a l i t y  which m a  
seek h i s  own i ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ u ~ ~ i o ~  f o r  Jumg fs that same 
a "hero" f o r  S nger. Of course, the descr ip-  
%on wfth oneself an 
f o r  example, t h e  
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of the psych@, do 
easi ly  stirred to dfsplay iiis heroism i n  action. Seeing which, we 
~ a ~ n ~ ~  but reflect tha source from which man could 
t for power, how 
f ~ r  help fs man, and 
do f o r  him is 
lready organized into 
1 help.  Suck help as the 
the livPng, what other  t o ,  axcept th 
(Singer, 1948, p. 34) 
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And t h e  he lp  t h a t  t h e  "dead" may t h e  hero is, for Sim 
aie mood, which is h i s  
t4fottrth idealt1 
nPy, and, as 1 thfnk,  properly 
e call t h e  heroic .  Under its sway we see 
r black,  face  th ings  n e i t h  
emotionally drunken courage mor emotiowally s t r i c k e n  f ea r .  
looks on the chances 
The hero 
hat l i e  before him w i t h  a l l  the c l a r f t y  of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  can command; he faces  t h e  known risk w i t h  
n e i t h e r  f e a r  nor  fuiy in h i s  heart; ha accepts  t h e  d 
but  one reason; realfsing t h a t  
kind is onlv t o  be worn by someone tak ing  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  r i s k  of t ry ing  
for  i t ,  he o f f e r s  hfmsePf as t h a t  one, OK q u i e t l y  accepts a t  t h e  hands 
of f a t e  t h e  role for which f a  8 c a s t  him. Such heroism as t h i s  
has no b io log ica l  past, It is not a b ioPog i s t s s  category; t h e  hero 
did not  come i n t o  being u n t i l  t h e  artist, the  t r a g i c  ar t is t ,  c rea ted  
hfm, And s i n c e  he ,  w t h  the mood t o  which he g ives  h i s  name, is 
e ~ ~ e n t i a ~ ~ y   work of art, is it not  P uch as he t h a t  t he  art ist  
makes us  when ~t of o ~ r ~ ~ ~ v e ~ ?  When he moves us out of 
our ordinary h selves i n t o  a n less of being st 
gerous game for 
ome ob jec t i6e  dear  to himself and his 
nger, 1948, p. 54)  
Jung's ~ o ~ c e ~ t  of ~ ~ n ~ w a l  is based on t h e  "co l l ec t ive  psyche," 
which, i n  spirit, is exac t ly  what Singer meant as 11: "Access t o  
the  c o l l e c t i v e  psyche p 
w h e ~ ~ e ~  t h  sen  
One would l i k e  to ha t o  t h a t  ~ e n e w ~ ~ ~  i n  some cases  because t h e  
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v i t a l  f e e l i n g s  f i n d  themselves thereby f o r t i f i e d ,  i n  o the r s  because it 
promises t h e  mind a r i c h  harves t  of new knowledge. I n  both cases ,  t hose  
who are unwil l ing t o  renounce t h e  treasures bur ied  i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
psyche w i l l  t r y  t o  r e t a i n ,  by any means poss ib l e ,  t h e  new elements whose 
advent has added something t o  t h e i r  primary reason f o r  l i v i n g .  The best 
means would seem t o  be i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  wi th  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  psyche, f o r  
t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  of t h e  personal  p o s i t i v e l y  i n v i t e s  one t o  plunge i n t o  
t h a t  'ocean of d i v i n i t y '  and, l o s i n g  a l l  memory, t o  merge oneself  wi th  
it. This  myst ica l  phenomenon, which i s  a propens i ty  of a l l  mankind, i s  
as i n n a t e  i n  everyone of us as t h e  ' d e s i r e  f o r  t h e  mother ' ,  t h e  longing 
t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  source from whence we came. 
"As  I have shown elsewhere," t h e r e  l i e s  at t h e  r o o t  of t h e  re- 
g res s ive  n o s t a l g i a  which Freud regards  as ' i n f a n t i l e  f i x a t i o n '  o r  in-  
cestuous d e s i r e ,  an e s s e n t i a l  value t o  which t h e  myths, f o r  example, 
bear  witness .  It i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  best and t h e  s t ronges t  among men, 
t h e  heroes ,  who give way t o  t h e i r  r eg res s ive  n o s t a l g i a  and purposely 
expose themselves t o  t h e  danger of being devoured by t h e  monstrous 
primal cause. But i f  a man i s  a hero ,  he i s  a hero because,  i n  t h e  
f i n a l  reckoning, he d id  not l e t  t h e  monster devour him, but  subdued 
i t - -not  once bu t  many times. It i s  i n  t h e  achievement of v i c t o r y  over 
t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  psyche t h a t  t h e  t r u e  va lue  l i e s ;  and t h i s  i s  t h e  meaning 
of  t h e  conquest of t h e  t r e a s u r e ,  of t h e  i n v i n c i b l e  weapon, t h e  magic 
talisman--in s h o r t ,  of a l l  those  d e s i r a b l e  goods t h a t  t h e  myths t e l l  
o f .  Anyone who i d e n t i f i e s  himself with t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  psyche, o r ,  i n  
symbolic language, le ts  himself be devoured by t h e  monster and becomes 
absorbed i n  he r ,  a l s o  a t t a i n s  t o  t h e  t r e a s u r e  defended by t h e  dragon, 
" C f .  The Psychology of t h e  Unconscious. 
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but  he does so  i n  s p i t e  of  himself and t o  h i s  own g r e a t  loss . "  
(Jung, 1953, p. 280) 
I t h i n k  I have s a i d  enough t o  e s t a b l i s h  a c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
Singer and Jung with r e spec t  t o  t h e  process of  individuat ion,  even 
though both were working independently and knew l i t t l e  o r  nothing of  
t h e  o t h e r ' s  e f f o r t s .  But now something needs t o  be s a i d  about t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two, which is also s t r i k i n g .  Jung's basic ex- 
h o r t a t i o n  i s  towards t h e  psyche as a r e a l i t y ,  and towards t h e  ind iv idua l  
psyche, while S inge r ' s  is  towards t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  "mankind", and towards 
t h e  most general  psyche. 
S e l f ,  S i n g e r ' s  t h e  completeness of  a l l  Selves.* 
Jung 's  hero seeks t h e  completeness of t h e  
Jung devotes most of h i s  l i f e  work t o  t h e  scho la r ly  examination of' 
t h e  sources h i s t o r y  provides of t h e  myriad of pathways of  i nd iv idua t ion ,  
while Singer devoted most of h i s  l i f e ' s  work t o  t h e  phi losophical  study 
of science and soc ie ty .  Singer h a s  made s o c i a l  moral i ty  a necessary 
condi t ion f o r  i nd iv idua l  moral i ty;  i nd iv idua l  moral i ty  only ga ins  i t s  
meaning i n  t h e  context  of a s e r v i c e  t o  mankind. Jung does t h e  opposi te ;  
only when t h e  ind iv idua l  has a t t a i n e d  a degree of  maturity w i l l .  he  
adequately respond t o  s o c i a l  problems. But I suspect t h a t  t h e  ch i ld ren  
of such pa ren t s  would f i n d  t h e i r  d i f f e rences  t o  be one of l i f e  s t y l e  
r a t h e r  than b a s i c a l l y  imDortant. It i s  c e r t a i n l y  n a t u r a l  t h a t  an  
i n t rove r t ed  th inke r  would i n  h i s  later yea r s  regard s e r v i c e  t o  mankind 
as t h e  most r e l evan t  aspect  of t h e  world, for thereby he can in t ro -  
ve r t ed ly  explore h i s  ex t rove r t ed  s i d e .  The young Jung of t h e  e a r l y  
*The d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  a s u b t l e  bu t  important one. I n  Jung t h e  "Self" 
i s  a c o l l e c t i v e ,  but  i s  not t h e  "sum" of all i nd iv idua l  s e l v e s ,  w h i l e  
for  Singer it i s :  nothing more can be added t o  t h e  concept of Se l f  
than what i s  contained i n  a i l  "selves".  
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experiments s t r i k e s  m e  as being ex t rove r t ed  th ink inp ,  and i f  t h i s  guess 
i s  accu ra t e ,  one can account for h i s  second s t a g e  of l i f e  as a search 
f o r  t h e  inner  l i f e .  
But where has a l l  t h i s  l e f t  u s  with r e spec t  t o  morali ty? Did 
Singer success fu l ly  s o l v e  t h e  problem of Ka.ntss second Cr i t i que  by 
"reducing" ind iv idua l  mora l i t y  t o  s o c i a l  moral i ty? 
because he d i d ,  I t h i n k ,  show how determinism and freedom are cons i s t en t  
with one another,* and thus  avoided t h e  awkward metaphysics of  Knnt's 
I n  one sense "yes", 
two worlds. Indeed, my guess i s  t h a t  s i n c e  19140, with t h e  pub l i ca t ion  
of Rosenbleuth' s , Bi gelow's, and Wiener s c l a s s i c  paper ( 1943 ) , appar- 
e n t l y  w r i t t e n  independently of S i n g e r ' s ,  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community 
recognizes t h a t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  freedom and mechanistic determinism are 
f u l l y  compatible ways of viewing t h e  world. 
But n e i t h e r  Jung nor Singer r e a l l y  solved Kant 's  bas i c  problem, 
namely, t h e  o r i g i n  and na tu re  of an a t e l e o l o g i c a l  moral l a w .  The 
moral quest ion i s ,  why undertake t h e  he ro ic  quest?  For Jung, t h e  answer 
i s ,  because you w i l l  be complete, and f o r  Si-nger, because thereby you 
w i l l  he lp  approximate mankind's completeness. But why be complete, 
o r  why t r y  t o  complete mankind? Jung could sca rce ly  s a y  t h a t  a man who 
had l i v e d  only one s i d e  of  himself i s  i n e v i t a b l y  unhappy. Some men 
have an immense capac i ty  t o  l i v e  ou t  t h e i r  l ives  as a puer ae t e rnus ,  
con t inua l ly  exc i t ed  by t h e  very process  of l i f e ,  and can be q u i t e  
eloquent a t  age s i x t y  about t h e  value of such a l i f e .  And as f o r  S inge r ,  
t h e r e  are thousands of obvious in s t ances  of comfortable,  contented do- 
nothings who a l s o  can wax eloquent on t h e  excel lence o f  doing nothing. 
*For a f u r t h e r  d i scuss ion  of t h i s  p o i n t ,  see, f o r  example, Churchman 
(1960) as w e l l  as Singer (1946) a 
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i n  t he  l i g h t  of t h e  dialogue we  
been s a i d  as fol lows:  
r e a l i t y  of mora l i ty  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  
kind of r e a l i t y  froan t h e  b ~ h a ~ i o r a l  phenomena of mank rad, and Singer 
d isagrees ,  For the "~ostulates"  of m o r a l ~ t y  arise from t he  
na tu re  of t h i s  i n d e ~ e ~ d e n t  ex is tence ,  For S%nger, t he  "postulates"  
are demands t h e  f ~ t u ~ @  ma on presemt choices:  if you Pike, t h e  
postubaees of m o r ~ l ~ ~ y  are i n  part what our  progeny would reques t  of us 
were they a l i v e  eo aye  The "voice of moral i ty"  is  our estimate o f  what 
they would wish. 
later years  suggested an hypothesis  of an independent 
psychic r e a l i t y ,  which might s e rve  as a modern vers ion  of Kant 's  o r  
Plato's on to log ica l  hypotheses. I n  any event ,  today is an exce l l en t  
occasion f o r  r a i s i n g  again the  ques t ion  of t he  r e a l i t y  of moral i ty ,  
because with t h e  "new" physics  and psychology, and 
i n  r econc i l ing  o r i e n  d occ iden ta l  sc ience ,  t he  whole sub jec t  of 
As we s h a l l  see i n  t h e  next chapter ,  Jung i n  h i s  
"acausal" 
increased i n t e r e s t  
r e a l i t y  is under P 
It is  clear t h a t  Sing@K'S v i  po in t  is the  soundest one from 
ic ~ o ~ ~ n i t y ,  s i n c e  i t  does not 
going beyond accepte  ays of ~OnceQtual iz ing  r e a l i t y .  It is a l s o  
clear t h a t  t he  P l a t  s f a r  more acceptab le  t o  a g rea t  m a w  
people who bel. ome " g r ~ a t @ ~  r e a l i t y ~ "  cage  
o r i g i n  of moral i ty .  (God, Freedom and Imortal i ty)  
a god, as t he  
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d ~ s ~ u ~ ~ ~ % ~  f n d a ~ e n t a l l y  ag ee: m o r a ~ i t y  
d i f f e r  about what "reason" means. 
of t h e  real world; f o r  Kant, i n  h i s  second 
tency, while  fo Singer  it might be descr ibed 
For P l a t o ,  
as the  s c i e n t i f i c  method. In Jung, reason is a confusing te 
has  a number of choices.  It co Id  desc r ibe  a psychological func t ion ,  
which has  i ts  real oppos $e, t he  i r r a t i o ~ a l *  There is no apparent re- 
e l f n k  m ~ r a l i ~ ~  wi th  e i t h e r  kind of func t ion ,  Rut 
Jung be l i eves  t h a t  t h e r e  is a sc ience  of t h e  psyche, which can account 
f o r  its r e a l i t y  and i t  
Jung could agree with Singer  t h a t  t h e  " r a t i o n a l i t y  of moral i ty"  is t h e  
i d e a l  of a s c i e n t i f i c  explanat ion of moral i ty ,  an i d e a l  t h a t  a l l  four  
would c e r t a i n l y  be l i eve  in .  
3 .  Moral i ty  and planning 
I n  its genera l  form, t h i s  ques t ion  asks  whether moralf tp  can be 
mani fes ta t ions ,  one of which is moral i ty .  Hence 
understood i n  a t e l e o l o g i c a l  framework. Singer says  y e s s  Kant s a y  no. 
P l a to  probably says yes ,  because mora l i ty  f o r  him means the  p r e s c r i p t i o n  
t o  seek higher  fo s of l i f e ,  e.g., t o  seek t o  contemplate t h e  Good, 
and hence i t  is e ~ p l a i ~ e d  t e l e o l o g i c a l l y .  As w e  have seen,  i f  Jung 
means t h a t  "moralityl' is t he  p r e s c r i p t i o  
ind iv idua t ion ,  then m o ~ a l i t y  i s  t e l e o l o g i c a l .  Hence the  burden is wfth 
Kant: t o  defend a p h i l o  ophy of l i f e  which is b a s i c a l l y  a t e l e o l o g i c a l .  
ough the  process  of: 
4. Morality and ~ ~ y c h o l o $ y  
our t h i s  Ps t h e  cen ral  i s s u e  and t h e  
the  middle anti t he  muddle, For P l a t o ,  t h e  journey of t he  psyche is t h e  
main poin t  of h f s  moral p Iosophy, only t o  be t o l d  i n  myths. POP Kant, 
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r y  is t h e  p s y ~ h o l o g ~ c  natur@ of the  Good W i l l ;  h 
he  same t i m e  b rsaf and ~ n d ~ ~ i ~ u a t @ d ?  POT Singer, 
t he  p ~ y c h o l o g i c a ~  urg 
and mystery of his philosophy. 
to  go beyond s a t i s f ~ ~ t ~ o n  is both the  s t  
Perhaps only i n  Jung do we see a 
er of u n d @ r s t a ~ d i ~ g  of t h e  role t h a t  mora l i ty  p l  gs i n  t h e  psyche, 
i n  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  of good and evil. 
insight e 
More needs t o  be s a i d  about h i s  
The next act m+st be mainly Kant's, with t h e  o the r s  c o n t r ~ b u ~ ~ ~ g  
as they see fit. We need t o  br ing  Kant i n t o  our  age, to  develop a 
modern theory of a t e l e o l o g i c a l  moral i ty .  Only then can the  dialogue 
i n g f u l l y  proceed. 
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